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▪ Currently trading at EUR 157.8, we value MTU shares with an 
upside potential of 25.1% until December 2019 (EUR 197.4) 
justifying our buy recommendation; consensus TP at 190.3 
▪ Our bullish view is supported by a more positive outlook on 
MTU’s production ramp-up and commercial position 
regarding the GTF. Moreover, we also see its Polish and 
Chinese JVs being severely undervalued by investors 
bearing a share price upside potential of EUR 26.3 
▪ MTU holds a strong Tier-1 competitive position in both 
segments (OEM and MRO) with great market prospects 
driven by recent and future engine programs 
▪ Commercial OEM revenues to experience a spike in 2018F 
(c. 30%; organic) resulting from a production ramp-up and 
massive GTF deliveries. Overall, impressive competitive 
dynamics thanks to new engine programs (mainly GTF) 
resulting in an estimated topline CAGR of 6.6% until 2027F. 
Profitability expected to pick-up after GTF ramp-up eases 
down and MTU enters a smooth consolidation phase with EBIT 
margins up from c. 8.1% in 2019F to c. 9.6 % in 2025F 
▪ MRO continues a success story thanks to V2500’s reign and 
GTF boost in years to come; top-line to see c.16% CAGR over 
2020F and c.6% over 2027F, although with lower operating 
margins as a result of the business model transition 
Company description 
MTU Aero Engines AG is a German producer of engine parts for 
both civil and military aircraft. By also operating in engine MRO it 
covers the entire engine lifecycle. It partners with the main engine 
OEMs - GE, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce - producing engines 
for the world’s largest aircraft producers (e.g. Airbus and Boeing) 
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Full steam ahead for MTU as end-
customers drive demand for engines 
and maintenance 
Recommendation: BUY 
Vs Previous Recommendation n.a 
Price Target Dec. 2019: 197.4 € 
Vs Previous Price Target n.a 
Price (as of 2 Jan 2019) 157.8 € 
Bloomberg as of 02/01/2019 
  
52-week range (€) 129.2-198.7 
Market Cap (€m) 10,030.9 
Fully diluted shares outstanding (m) 55.5 
Source: MTU, Bloomberg 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg; Note: Rebased as of 02/01/2018; 
Percentages highlight 1-year performance 
  
(Values in € millions) 2017 2018E 2019F 
Revenues 5,036 5,804 6,507 
EBITDA 723 644 746 
EBITDA margin 14.4% 12.3% 11.3% 
EBIT 527 492 561 
EBIT margin 9.1% 10.5% 8.5% 
Net income 393 320 365 
Net income margin 8.8% 7.8% 5.5% 
EPS 7.4 6.2 7.1 
EV/Sales 2.57x 2.29x 2.11x 
EV/EBITDA 17.9x 20.6x 18.4x 
EV/EBIT 24.6x 27.0x 24.5x 
P/E 22.6x 27.0x 23.6x 
Leverage 1.4x 1.7x 1.5x 
Source: MTU, Analyst estimates 
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Company overview 
Founded in 1934 and headquartered in Munich, Germany, MTU Aero Engines 
AG (“MTU” or “the Company”) is a manufacturer of engine parts with worldwide 
presence in 12 countries. It operates in two segments (1) Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) for commercial and military engines (47.9% and 7.8% of 
2017A Sales, respectively) and (2) maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) 
(44.3% of 2017A sales). Through associates and subsidiaries, it is also present 
in the engine leasing business, thereby covering the entire engine lifecycle. Main 
parts produced are high-pressure and low-pressure turbines as well as turbine 
center frames1. The Company partners with core engine OEM players – General 
Electric (GE), Pratt & Whitney (PW) and Rolls-Royce (RR) – which together 
generate around 64% of MTUs revenues. The majority of revenues are 
generated in North America, although the company operates production and 
maintenance facilities also across Europe and Asia. As of 2017A, it employs 
8,846 people, of which 68% in OEM and the remaining in MRO. 
 
The company went public in 2005 after having been owned by KKR & Co. for two 
years2. Since then, it has grown impressively, generating revenues of EURm 
5.036 in 2017A (2006A EURm 2,416). Most recently, the company engaged in 
the development of an innovative engine solution in partnership with Pratt & 
Whitney and the Japanese Aero Engine Corporation – the geared turbo-fan 
engine (“GTF”) – which constitutes a highly relevant part of MTUs equity story. 
Shareholder structure 
As of 31 December 2017, MTU had 51,499,842 shares outstanding of which 99% 
were in free float. With 93%, the majority were held by institutional investors, while 
the rest were held by retail investors (6%) and MTU (1% treasury shares). Around 
36% of shares were owned by institutional investors with more than 3% of voting 
rights according to German Securities Trading Act. The share of institutional 
investors has constantly increased over the last 8 years from 87%. Its institutional 
investors are strongly focused in the Anglo-Saxon regions with over 60% being 
based in the US (32%) and the UK (31%). The remaining ones are from Germany 
(13%), France (10%) and other countries (13%)3. The company regularly engages 
in buying back and issuing shares for employee and executive compensation 
purposes (e.g. MAP employee stock option program). 
                                                 
1 Additionally, the Company operates in marine and industrial gas turbines and corresponding maintenance. We consider this and the 
engine leasing businesses to be non-core due to MTUs low strategic focus as well as immaterial revenue and profit contributions 
2 The company had previously been sold by DaimlerChrysler to KKR in late 2003 for an undisclosed amount 
3 MTU annual report 2017. Approximation based on top 50 largest shareholder 
37.8%
17.8%
8.7%
35.8%
Major customer 1 Major customer 2
Major customer 3 Other customers
Graph 2 – Revenue by customers
Source: MTU
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MTU and the broad airline industry 
MTU’s underlying business performance and future development are strongly tied 
to the wider aviation industry. Specifically, future demand for new aircraft and 
maintenance of new and existing engines, as well as spare parts these activities 
generate. 
 
Typically, air traffic demand growth had closely been tied to global GDP growth; 
however, in the recent past (since 2014) there has been a slight mismatch 
between both, in which demand for air travel measured by revenue passenger per 
kilometer (RPK4) is outgrowing GDP growth. Key drivers for this decoupling effect 
have been depressed oil and jet fuel prices together with rising disposable 
income, expanding middle classes, increased tourism and travel propensity as 
well as historically low interest rate levels. Excluding the latter, these effects have 
been more significant in developing markets in Asia (particularly China and India) 
and Latin America – and they are widely expected to continue in the future, further 
driving air travel demand rather independently from worldwide GDP growth. 
 
Jet fuel (or oil, more broadly) usually constitutes the largest cost driver for airlines, 
and it has been at extremely low levels in the last three years; the lower cost 
structure has allowed for decreasing air fares, thereby driving air travel demand up 
and pushing up airlines’ revenue and operating margins as well as increasing 
available seats per mile (ASM). Forecasts suggest price levels of USD 65.5/bl by 
Q1 20195, which is still 40% below the USD/bl 109.5 peak in 2011. Even though 
lower oil prices help fostering demand via lower fares, we expect aircraft demand 
to reach record growth rates despite oil price developments. The main reason lies 
in the fact that the new aircraft engine programs already in market (and especially 
the ones under development) are much more fuel-efficient, aircrafts are lighter and 
more optimized towards seat/capacity efficiency, driven by increasingly modern 
technology and design, which can observed in recent aircraft & engine pieces. 
 
As important, tourism has become more prevalent across the globe: disposable 
income in developing markets has been growing massively, with an increasing 
share of spending in tourism and travel. These markets are poised to represent 
the lion’s share of growth, with China and India growing this metric at a CAGR of 
8% and 11%, respectively, compared with 2.1% and 3.6% in the US and other 
                                                 
4 Traditional metric to measure demand for air traffic. RPK measures the number of kilometers (or miles - RPM) travelled by passengers. 
Airlines typically track RPK in conjunction with ASK (available seats per kilometer) metric, providing them an overview of demand and 
supply market dynamics 
5 Median analyst price forecasts compiled by Bloomberg as of May 2018. Naturally, these forecasts change frequently, especially in the 
recent past given constant news and developments emerging about current and future price levels 
Graph 5 – WTI crude oil (USD/bl) and 
jet fuel price development 
Source: EIA 
Note: See footnote no.5 
Graph 4 – World RPK historical 
development 
Source: IATA, IMF 
  
MTU AERO ENGINES AG COMPANY REPORT 
 
 
 
  PAGE 5/51 
 
 
 
advanced economies, respectively. Forecasts point to persistent growth in 
worldwide travel demand, with the total number of trips to increase significantly. 
Again, recent and future key growth comes from emerging markets, especially 
China and India, where the spread between growth in trips per capita and 
population growth is much higher compared to advanced economies. 
 
Moreover, low-cost carriers (LCC)6 have additionally contributed to increased air 
travel and aircraft demand; the surge in number of low-cost carriers led to the 
creation of additional routes and intensified competition, driving fares down and 
creating a cyclical effect resulting in increased travel demand. Over the last 10 
years, seat capacity of LCCs has increased by 130% from 0.66bn to 1.52bn, 
which represents an LCC market share increase of c. 50% from 19.2% to 28.7%. 
The trend is expected to further continue - again, the Asian region will see strong 
growth, while Europe and North America are expected to experience a rather 
moderate expansion. 
 
Record-low interest rates in the recent years have also contributed to passenger 
and cargo air traffic through higher business and consumer spending as well as 
cheap financing for airlines and leasing companies. 
 
As a result, we expect demand for aircraft and after-market services7 to increase 
substantially. The impact on MTU is clear: both the OEM and MRO businesses 
stand to benefit from an uptick in aircraft, engine and maintenance needs.  
Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) 
segment 
The market for aircraft structures and engines is mostly organized under “risk-
revenue sharing” agreements in which several partners along the value chain 
combine knowledge, technology and capacity to design parts and components 
used in the final product, much like the automotive industry. Overall, MTU’s supply 
chain – constituted by the key aircraft and engine OEMs as well as Tier 1-3 
suppliers – can be summarized in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 While there has been an emerging distinction between low cost carrier and ultra-low-cost carrier, we define both in one category “low 
cost carrier “ 
7 Includes maintenance, repair and overhaul as well as spare parts sales 
Graph 8 – Spread to population 
growth and trips per capita 
growth 
Source: Airbus, IHS, Sabre; Note: 
CAGR 2017A – 2022F 
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Market dynamics and revenue forecast 
Facing increased traffic demand, airlines can react either by increasing load 
factors8 or by increasing capacity; however, they have been increasing the former 
to previously unseen levels: today, fleets are operated at load factors of around 
80% on average, compared to 65% just 15 years ago9. Hence, it will be highly 
challenging to increase or sustain these levels further to accommodate expected 
demand. On the other hand, to increase capacity, airlines can improve asset 
utilization – flying more hours or delaying retirements – which might be feasible in 
the short but not in the long-term. Hence, their most realistic option is to increase 
their fleet size; therefore, industry experts and executives expect the size of the 
current world fleet to significantly expand by c.3.7% (YoY) until 202810, whereby 
the most significant growth will come from China and India11. Mature markets such 
as North America and Europe are expected to grow at lower digits. 
Narrow bodies are expected to continue dominating 
air travel 
The world’s narrow body fleet is expected to increase by 5.2% YoY until 2028F, 
representing the strongest growth compared to all other aircraft types. Over this 
period, their share will rise from currently 56% to 66%, of which the A320neo and 
B737 MAX are expected to represent c. 75%, both relevant for MTU. 
 
Nowadays, short-haul routes dominate air travel, and they are widely expected to 
maintain their relevance going forward. Europe and North America in general have 
had a higher demand for narrow body jets (27% and 24% respectively) given 
shorter distances to fly as well as hub-and-spoke routes (particularly in the US). 
These regions will experience mainly replacement orders from legacy carriers and 
slight fleet increases as well as larger orders from LCCs in the short term, hence 
experiencing rather low but stable growth rates compared to developing markets. 
More significant demand for short-haul aircraft will come from emerging markets, 
especially within Asia-Pacific, and in particular China and India. These regions 
have been undergoing strong regional development driven by economic growth 
and liberalization, which we are confident will remain a strong trend going forward. 
Traffic between tier-2 and tier-3 airports12 has in many of these regions been 
underserved and is expected to grow significantly; the historical development of 
regional routes in China provides a good example and holds true for other 
                                                 
8 Load factor refers to the ratio of RPK (revenues-passenger per kilometer) to ASK (available seats per kilometer) measuring aircraft 
capacity utilization, a core operating metric monitored in the industry 
9 Reflects improved scheduling, efficient passenger yield management and technology improvements both in airframe, engine 
architecture and engineering (IATA 2017) 
10 “Global fleet & MRO market forecast commentary 2018-2028”, Oliver Wyman, May 2018 
11 Countries refer to the geographic location where airlines or lessors of aircrafts are based  
12 Tier 1: >15m passengers per year; tier 2: 1m - 15m passengers per year; tier 3: <1m passengers per year 
Faced with unseen demand 
levels, Airbus and Boeing’s 
production sites have never 
been this busy 
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emerging economies such as ASEAN countries, Latin America and India as well. 
On such routes, mainly smaller to mid-sized narrow-body and regional jets are 
required to operate at high utilization and fuel efficiency. All in all, developing 
economies are poised to represent the largest share in fleet growth, with China 
and India the key growth markets, as well as Middle East and LATAM.  
 
Even though LCCs have started to enter the long-haul market (e.g. Norwegian, 
AirAsia and WOW Air), they are expected to continue predominantly operating 
short-haul routes with narrow-body aircraft13. Modern, medium-sized models such 
as the A320neo and B737 MAX present the largest operating performance 
improvements, providing higher capacity utilization and fuel efficiency. Hence, 
LCCs are expected to remain key demand drivers for narrow-bodies: of the major 
outstanding orders for the A320ceo and A320neo families which account for 
c.80% of total Airbus (unfilled) orders, around 79% are from LCCs14. Moreover, 
Boeing estimates that LCCs will increase their fleet share exponentially over the 
next 20 years, from roughly 1/4 to about 1/3 of the world’s total.  
 
In order to pick up with rising demand for short-haul air travel and to improve 
operating margins, airlines are increasingly replacing older, less fuel-efficient fleet 
by new models. Additionally, various routes worldwide which have been served by 
regional jets increasingly require higher seat capacity. All in all, the most 
prominent narrow body aircraft platforms – A320neo and Boeing 737MAX – will 
together account for around 92% of deliveries; indeed, both Airbus and Boeing are 
facing unseen production rates, expecting to stabilize A320neo / B737 MAX 
production between 60 and 70 a month in the next year, up from between 40 and 
50 during 2017. 
Significant upside potential in the narrow body 
segment for MTU – GTF vs LEAP 
As of today, the most significant narrow body platforms for MTU are the A320ceo 
families and the Boeing MD-90 range, powered by the V2500 which is being 
phased-out and currently generates significant aftermarket1516 sales. Additionally, 
the Boeing MD-80 range, powered by the JT8D-20 – also designed by Pratt & 
Whitney (PW) and MTU – is 2 years away from full market phase-out and is still 
generating significant aftermarket sales. 
 
                                                 
13 Given that establishing the LCC model for long-haul is highly complex – capital, operating, legal and regulatory requirements are much 
higher. Carriers are usually required to invest in new fuel-efficient aircrafts (e.g. B787) in order to operate profitably 
14 As of 31. May 2018 
15 Aftermarket services includes both maintenance and spare-parts sales 
16 The last engine sale is expected in 2019. In 2018, MTU expects to produce 200-250 engines 
Graph 13 – Total unfulfilled 
narrow-body orders - Boeing 
Source: Boeing 
Graph 15 – Total unfulfilled 
narrow body orders - Airbus 
Source: Airbus O&D (as of May 
2018) 
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Looking forward, the most substantial market share potential for MTU within the 
narrow body segment lies on the A320neo, which constitutes a significant part of 
MTU’s equity story and growth potential. Given the strong growth of LCCs and the 
currently largest aircraft orders outstanding, LCCs will be a significant contributor 
to MTUs revenues in the near future with even more potential in the future. 
However, the PW1100G17 engine, one of two engine options for the A320neo, is 
heavily competing with CFM’s (GE and Safran) LEAP engine. Since its release, 
the PW1100G has been drawing negative attention due to technical issues 
leading to delivery halts from Airbus and unplanned groundings of operating 
aircraft. This has led to the LEAP taking on some market share from the 
PW1100G. However, the LEAP has also faced certain issues18. Nonetheless, the 
GTF has caused more severe delays but it is also worth mentioning that none of 
them were related to MTU’s parts. So far, PW has been able to secure contracts 
for only 44% of the A320neo family engines while CFM accounts for the rest. As 
PW has been able to fix the issues earlier this year19 and a great majority of 
airplane orders are still unfilled – with many engine choices still to be made20 – 
there is still significant upside potential for the PW1100G. Today’s customers can 
be less worried about any minor early stage issues with the engine, as orders 
placed today will be fulfilled not earlier than 2020, until when they can certainly be 
fixed. Given the significant future demand for the A320neo, the success of the 
PW1100G has a crucial effect on PW ’s and MTU’s top line, and not so much for 
Safran and GE, as their LEAP engine is the sole option for the direct competitor of 
A320neo, the B737 MAX. Industry experts argue that the GTF family is a novelty, 
perhaps too much of it - indeed, its underlying technology and design is 
completely different to what airlines across the world have been used to. This 
naturally leads them to rely on the LEAP, which is architecturally similar to its 
predecessor (CFM56). Additionally, the choice between engines may be 
influenced by the fleet airlines already operate. Given the fact that CFM is the sole 
engine supplier for the current and future Boeing 737 models, airlines might tend 
towards CFM engines for new A320neo family orders: equipment alignment with 
existing fleets tends to generate cost synergies as it allows for faster and thus 
cheaper training of staff in maintenance, for example. These factors might 
constitute significant pressure on MTU’s PW1100G market share potential. As an 
example, this year Lion Air ordered 380 LEAP engines following their historical 
usage of the CFM56 in all their existing fleet. Indeed, CFM has historically 
                                                 
17 Developed by Pratt & Whitney (a United Technology subsidiary), MTU and Japanese Aero Engines Corporation (JAEC), which powers 
the A320neo whereas the overall engine family is referred as “PW1000G” or “GTF” (Geared Turbo Fan) 
18 In January 2018, Reuters reported CFM had quality issues with around 70 LEAP-1A engines (A320neo) which had to be overhauled 
leading to delayed plane deliveries for about a month 
19 MTU additionally confirmed this in its H2 earnings call  
20 As of May 2018, c. 30% of A320neo customers have not decided on the engine choice 
In the long-term MTU expects the 
GTF to account for c. 50% in 
A320neo market share  
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dominated the narrow body engine market with around 70% market share vs. 
IAE’s21 20% (key products for both are the CFM56 and V2500, respectively).  
Finally, some topline potential over the next 10 years will come from around 800 
total orders22 of the MC-21 and C-Series (A22023), for which MTU is the exclusive 
engine supplier (GTF). 
Slow and steady growth in the widebody segment 
The increased flexibility and efficiency in itineraries demanded by customers 
across the world has led airlines to focus on adding more frequencies to their 
route offering, while increasing non-stop flights within their networks. Hence, and 
in-line with our estimates for narrow bodies, we expect the widebody segment to 
experience a turnaround with demand for mid-sized widebodies to rise 
significantly, increasing its market share from 49% to 64% in the next 10 years. 
This development will take off a large part of market share from small widebodies, 
which today account for 37% (2028F: 19%). Hence, we see increased demand for 
the Boeing 787 and Airbus A350-900 which fall in the intermediate size within 
wide-bodies – substantially more modernized, fuel-efficient and tech-driven than 
its larger counterparts (e.g. B747-8 and A380)24. 
 
Despite the overall unattractiveness of large widebodies for most legacy carriers, 
they are expected to increase slightly from currently 14% in market share to 17%. 
There are routes under which they can regularly be filled (e.g. London – Los 
Angeles) and be operated economically. Here we see demand for future 
replacement and new orders for the 777X and A350-1000. Moreover, Middle East 
carriers such as Emirates heavily rely on larger widebodies; given their young fleet 
age, we may see some small additions or replacements in the short-term, but 
stronger demand over the long-term. Finally, in the (very) long term, there may be 
positive demand dynamics for larger widebodies given strained airport capacity 
and saturation of airlines slots, especially as air traffic increases significantly25. 
This might overturn the present “hype” around intermediate/large narrow bodies, 
that could lead to overpopulation of air-related infrastructures.  
 
                                                 
21 IAE (International Aero Engines) is the joint venture between PW, MTU and JAEC together producing the V2500 
22 Oliver Wyman 2018-2028 fleet and MRO forecast 
23 Renamed as A220 by Airbus as it took control over the aircraft program (previously coined “Bombardier C-Series”) – presented at 
Farnborough June 2018 concentration 
24 Newer large widebody aircrafts operate with just two engines whereas the older ones operate with four engines. Hence, the latter are 
comparatively less fuel efficient because high load factors are often difficult to sustain over the year on super-large widebodies (except in 
certain regions such as the Middle East), making them overall less efficient and thus unattractive to the majority of legacy carriers 
25 There are certainly physical limits to airport and air space capacity and hence a limit to the total number of aircraft in the year. We 
believe that the currently observed (and expected) demand - especially for narrow bodies – is not sustainable in the long-term. Therefore, 
to relieve airports and air space, there is likely to be some shift towards more wide bodies in the (very) long term. 
Large-size widebody aircraft 
accounted for 32% of the active 
fleet in 1996. In 2017, that 
number declined to around 11% 
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Strong positioning in engines for popular wide bodies 
The wide body engine market is more diversified compared to the narrow body, 
with airlines usually having up to three engine choices from (mostly) GE, PW and 
RR. MTU’s growth story in the widebody segment lies significantly within the B787 
and B777X, with some residual orders and expected deliveries for the B777 
Classic. MTU is strongly positioned as a partner with GE involved in the 
development of the GE9X engine – to exclusively power the B777X – as well as 
the GEnx, which powers the B787 and currently has a 60% market share vs. Trent 
1000 (Rolls-Royce). Indeed, GE Aviation is a long-standing market leader within 
the wide body segment, with c.51% market share in 201626.  
 
With around 1,450 expected deliveries over the next 10 years and currently 686 
(unfilled) orders, the B787 is expected to be the dominant widebody. The GEnx 
has been the preferable choice for most airlines and leasing companies27 
compared to the Rolls-Royce Trent 1000, which has generated a series of 
recurring problems, with its CEO Warren East accounting for USDm 800 in costs 
for replacing faulty turbine blades on B787 engines28. On the B777X – for which 
production will start in 2020 – the exclusive engine is the GE9X in which MTU is 
participating with a 4% program share. As of today, 326 planes have been ordered 
and in total around 410 planes are expected to be delivered over the next 10 
years. Though there are still some orders outstanding for the B777 Classic as of 
today (5729), with the introduction of the B777X, the PW4000 engine which is only 
used on the 777 Classic will contribute to MTU’s revenue through only a few new 
sales but mainly through higher-margin aftermarket activity. The CF6 used on the 
current A330 family and B767 is currently at the end of the series production and 
will mainly contribute through aftermarket sales. A few new sales will come from a 
forecasted demand of around 60 new 767 as well as currently 62 outstanding 
freighter orders. Finally, there will be some very low future demand from new 
A380 orders which are forecasted to amount for around 50 over the next 10 years; 
on this aircraft, the GP7000 engine (in which MTU participates) is competing with 
RR’s Trent 900. 
Overall, the widebody fleet is expected to grow at a 4.1% CAGR over the next five 
years, and at 2.8% over the following five-year period30. We expect MTU to 
capture significant growth due to its presence with the GEnx and GE9x which will 
                                                 
26 FlightGlobal, 2016 
27 Industry experts consider the GEnx to be the best-performing wide-body engine. See “What to consider when choosing engines”, 
AirFinance Journal Issue May 2018 
28 “The world’s three biggest engine-makers hit a snag”, The Economist, 23 June 2018 
29 Other (additional) 35 orders are for the 777 freighter version 
30 Oliver Wyman 2018-2028 fleet and MRO forecast 
  
MTU AERO ENGINES AG COMPANY REPORT 
 
 
 
  PAGE 11/51 
 
 
 
power the most demanded aircraft in the segment, hence, we end up 
incorporating growth forecasts in-line with the market’s expected development. 
Regional and business jets31 
Currently, over half of regional jets are operated in North America. Given the need 
to connect many dispersed smaller airports all over the U.S. and Canada as well 
as predominant hub-to-spoke points, the continent will experience a constant but 
low demand for regional jets in the near future. Demand will come mainly from 
replacement orders and a small number of new orders given increasing air traffic.  
The main barriers for future growth in the U.S. are scope clauses under which the 
largest U.S. airlines operate. These restrict fleet sizes, seat number per plane and 
weight, with airlines either already operating at limit or close to it. The soon to be 
introduced next generation 76-seaters MRJ90 and E175E2 – for MTU highly 
relevant models – will likely exceed the maximum take-off weight (MWTO) for 
most US airlines. Artificially reducing MWTO by lowering fuel levels will reduce 
flying range significantly, making the new jets too “expensive turbo-prop jets” and 
therefore not interesting for US airlines. These clauses become amendable soon 
in 2019 (Delta and United) and 2020 (American Airlines). So far, it is difficult to 
form a well-grounded opinion on the outcome as well as its impact on future 
regional jet fleet sizes. However, further developments might surface in the 
coming months allowing for updated model assumptions and forecasts. 
 
Relevant foreseeable demand for regional jets will therefore come from other 
markets – once again emerging economies in Asia. As is the case with narrow 
body demand, regional jets are attractive to airlines on hub-to-spoke routes as 
well as traffic to and between tier-2 and tier-3 airports, particularly with less than 
100 passengers per day. In China, for example, more than 50% of intra-regional 
routes have less than 100 passengers; in Latin America, 90% of intra-regional 
routes are below 1,000 miles making regional jets attractive. This demand is 
expected to sustain over the long-term; depending on the outcome of negotiations 
in the U.S., additional and maybe significant demand may surge. 
 
Regarding the business aircraft segment, the worst performing platform with the 
fleet growing at a CAGR of 2.7% in the past four years, vis-à-vis a CAGR of 
between 5% and 6% for the two decades before 201032, it is expected to see 
                                                 
31 We separated narrow bodies from regional aircraft: the new models (Embraer E2 and Bombardier’s C-Series – renamed A220 after 
Airbus acquired the program) often lie in between the two categories, both due to thrust power and seat capacity range they offer. Hence, 
many analysts and experts refer to them as crossover narrow bodies” – with flexibility to serve many different types of carrier business 
models. We previously included Bombardier’s C-Series within the narrow body segment given its larger thrust power and seat capacity, 
and now we include Embraer’s E2 jets within the regional aircraft segment which entails comparatively lower levels on the mentioned 
features 
32 Bombardier Business Aircraft Market Forecast 2016 – 2025 
The soon-amendable scope-
clauses in the US may bring 
another strong push for the GTF 
engine in the regional and 
business jet segments 
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some growth especially coming from the large business jet segment in which new 
aircraft is expected to be deployed over the next years, culminating in an 8% 
CAGR between 2015A and 2025F33. The key drivers behind this expected uptick 
in demand rely essentially on improved economic growth, increased penetration 
within emerging markets34 (largely underserved), as well as intrinsic replacement 
demand from the current fleet. However, the business jet segment is – in our view 
- the most sensitive one to economic growth, business cycles and confidence, and 
MTU’s positioning is not material. Hence the top-line head and tailwinds are 
relatively insignificant. Overall, we expect low stable growth looking forward. 
Massive potential in the regional jet engine market for 
MTU 
With 91% market share in the regional segment, CFM’s CF34 engine dominates 
the regional jet market, while MTU offers only MRO services for this powerplant. In 
the future, with the introductions of the MRJ in 2020 as well as three versions of 
the E-Jet E2 in 2018, 2019 and 2020, MTU will be able to capture c.90%35 of the 
regional jet market as new deliveries of all these aircraft platforms will be almost 
exclusively powered by the GTF engine family36. In the business jet segment, we 
are confident on MTU being able to capture the growth potential coming from the 
large segment via its positioning with the PW800 (in development, yet already fully 
certified and waiting for EIS, expected by Q4 2018) – the exclusive engine option 
for the new G500, G600 and Dassault’s F8X, in early development phase. 
Moreover, MTU’s participation in the PW300/500’s positions are able to capture 
some limited growth from light and medium segments. 
MTU’s current military presence to stagnate; export 
potential presents only slight growth opportunities 
Overall, military expenditure increased across the board to a new peak in 2017 – 
2.2% of world GDP (USDbn 1,739). Key regional drivers over the recent past have 
been the US, China, India, Russia and the Middle East37. These levels are in line 
with historical ones, providing no signs of contraction. Looking forward, military 
spending is expected to rise at a very decent pace, although mostly driven by 
capital deployment into cybersecurity, intelligence, reconnaissance and unmanned 
aircraft. Thus, we see limited upside potential for MTU as a provider of engine 
                                                 
33 According to Bombardier’s projections 
34 Greater China alone is expected to generate a CAGR of 10% in fleet size growth between 2015 and 2025, increasing from 405 to 
1095, with 700 new deliveries and only 10 replacements 
35 MTU company presentation 2018 
36 Mitsubishi’s MRJ: PW1200G / Embraer’s E2-Jet Family: PW1700&1900G (all part of the GTF family) 
37 SPIRI Fact Sheet, May 2018: “Trends in world military expenditure 2017” 
The United States and Middle 
East are the most representative 
countries in military spending as 
% of GDP. With approx. USDbn 
619 in 2017, the United States 
accounted for over 1/3 of 
worldwide military spending 
The core players in the business jet 
segment are releasing new models 
in the next five years, with MTU 
engines being the exclusive option 
for: 
• 2018: Gulfstream’s G500; 
Bombardier Global7000 
• 2019: Gulfstream’s G600 
• 2022: Dassault Falcon 8X 
 
 
 
“(…) The main driver [of demand for 
business jets] is business 
confidence and the underlying 
business environment (…)” 
 
Scott Donnelly, Chairman and CEO 
of Textron, CNBC, 15 October 2018 
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components and aftermarket services for military aircraft, at least for its current 
client base. 
 
MTU participates in engine programs for combat aircraft, helicopters and 
transporters with focus on the following engines (and vehicles): F110 (Lockheed 
F-16 and Boeing F-15), EJ200 (Eurofighter), RB199 (Panavia Tornado), T408 
(CH-53K) and TP400-D6 (Airbus400M). The German armed forces and other 
NATO members have been key customers and important revenue sources for 
MTU in military OEM and MRO38, with the F-16 and the Eurofighter being the most 
used military aircraft among NATO members. The latter comprises 348 active 
units and 66 in order backlog within all NATO members in 2017. 
 
Core and other NATO countries39 constitute very mature and low growth markets; 
most of them may require only some fleet additions and replacements. Despite 
recent pressures by the US administration for member countries to comply with 
the “2.0% guideline”, it is highly unlikely that NATO countries with spending in the 
1-1.5% range will increase their spending to 2%, as they would need to increase 
their total spending by unreasonably high rates (in gross terms). The new U.S. 
administration increased their military budget outlays and are expected to rise 
even further in the near future. Therefore, within these countries, we believe 
mostly the U.S. can bring some upside potential in the short to mid-term, 
especially with the new T408 engines. Additionally, Germany and other 
Eurofighter countries could also only slightly improve top-line growth. Overall, 
implicit in our forecast, we expect core NATO countries to maintain their current 
expenditure levels.  
 
On the other hand, we see increasing revenue opportunities coming from “export 
potential” countries, such as the Middle East, where military spending is on the 
rise. Recent orders from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait constitute an actual proof 
of such potential. For instance, Qatar and Kuwait signed export deals for 24 and 
28 Eurofighter jets, respectively40, whereas Saudi Arabia has already received 72 
Eurofighters in 2017. Hence, export potential within the Middle East is what holds 
our forecasts for MTU’s military turnover barely positive. 
 
                                                 
38 Military revenue includes both OEM (engine component manufacturing and spare-parts) and MRO (maintenance) 
39 Core NATO countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States; 
Other NATO countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania; 
Export potential: Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
40 Military aircraft developed under a consortium by Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo; MTU participates in the engine joint-venture 
with GE (EJ200; program share: 30%), providing components (low and high-pressure turbines), maintenance and assembly & testing for 
engines destined for Germany) 
Core and other NATO countries 
will contribute with some low 
stable growth through fleet 
additions and replacements. 
Especially the U.S. and 
Eurofighter countries such as 
Germany are important top-line 
drivers in our valuation 
 
Most recently, MTU engaged in a 
new partnership with GE for the 
development of T408 engines for 
the new CH-54K military pieces 
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Additional potential for mid-to-long-term demand will come from a Eurofighter 
upgrade expected around 2025, representing a replacement option for current 
Eurofighter countries as well as new sales potential. Moreover, Airbus revealed a 
concept fighter for 2030-2040 representing a successor for the Eurofighter41. 
Given MTUs extensive experience in the fighter engine market (covering c.45% of 
the entire current market) as well as constant R&D expenditure and synergies 
between commercial and military engines, we believe it is well positioned to 
capture future market potential. Recently, the Company announced a JV with 
Safran, targeting 50/50 engine participation towards this aircraft program. 
 
However, given persisting issues with the A400M, we believe delivery delays may 
further occur and postpone MTU’s revenue recognition. Additionally, we see a 
potential, though low, threat of cancelations of the current 143 outstanding orders, 
as occurred in the past. Thus, the export potential could be also be under threat. 
 
The EJ200 engine for the current Eurofighter tranche 3 production is the main 
revenue driver. Around 130 fighters are in production which translates into 260 
engines for which MTU is still to deliver components. Previous (active) tranche 2 
and 1 pieces suffer recurrent maintenance needs, hence EJ200’s aftermarket 
(parts and MRO) provides strong revenue contribution as well. Tranche 3 will last 
until 2021, whereas a potential update option of tranche 1 will kick in c.2025, as 
mentioned above, providing additional topline support. In 2020, the KC-390 and 
CH-53K42 are expected to enter into service, providing additional topline support 
for the military segment, which is expected to suffer even more significantly in-
between tranche 3 run-out and tranche 1 updates. 
OEM top-line projections: GTF sales to push 2018F 
revenue up by c. 30%; military segment remains stable 
with some long-term potential 
Overall, the GTF engine is the main revenue driver in the commercial OEM 
segment. We expect commercial revenues to be up c. 30% in 2018F (organic) due 
to MTUs largest ramp-up in its history which doubles GTF output in 2018F. As a 
result, we estimate a burn rate43 of 0.53 up from 0.38 last year, which we expect to 
gradually decrease until 2021 and then stabilize within historical levels.  
After 2019, the last sale of the V2500 will free up some production capacity (c. 200 
units in 2018F). This will come at a good time with the start of serial production of 
                                                 
41 https://www.aerosociety.com/news/airbus-reveals-tornado-successor-concept-for-2040s/ 
42 Embraer’s newest transporter jet, powered by IAE’s (MTU program share 16%) V2500; CH-53K: heavy-lift cargo helicopter developed 
by Sykorsky for the USA, powered by the T408 (GE and MTU partnership; MTU provides the power turbines, program share: 18.4%) 
43 BTB = (Backlog (t) – Backlog (t-1)) / Revenue (t); Burn Rate = Revenue (t) / Backlog (t-1), where BTB reflects demand dynamics; 
Burn Rate reflects delivery capacity 
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
Graph 32 - BTB and Burn Rates - 
Military
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
0,00
0,30
0,60
0,90
1,20
Burn rate (LHS)
Book-to-bill (RHS)
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
Graph 31 - BTB and Burn Rates - 
Commercial OEM
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1,40
1,60
1,80
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
Burn rate (LHS) Book-to-bill (RHS)
  
MTU AERO ENGINES AG COMPANY REPORT 
 
 
 
  PAGE 15/51 
 
 
 
the GE9X supporting revenues, after the main outstanding GTF orders as of 
today44 are produced and the V2500 is discontinued. Additionally, the GEnx is 
produced at a level of 200-250 units per year providing stable revenues. 
 
Regarding military OEM, we expect 2018F to see revenues down significantly by 
c. 12% on the back of a depressed order backlog. Between 2019 and 2021, we 
expect close to no expansion in revenues, until 2021-2025 when new 
opportunities may arise, with the first contributions from the new Eurofighter 
program. Given the low output in this segment and MTU’s high production 
capacity, we believe there is room for higher output, explaining stable burn rates 
of 1,1 in the explicit and perpetuity periods.  
 The cost side in OEM 
MTU has substantially underperformed the considered peer group in terms of 
operating efficiency, albeit having started to catch up since 2015 and converging 
towards the group’s average EBIT margin as of 2017 – which has been 
sequentially decreasing: a trend remarkably led by Rolls Royce, GKN and IHI 
Corporation, whereas Safran and GE Aviation have performed very well45. MTU 
has employed an ambitious strategy to tackle the bottom-line, with its own supply 
chain organized to maximize cost optimization while assuring high quality 
standards. Its high-tech facility in Munich is focused in sophisticated parts and 
production processes and constitutes the knowledge/know-how “HQ”; in Reszów, 
MTU holds a “mid-tech” facility which adopts more standardized production lines 
and parts manufacturing, while sourcing raw materials and some finished parts 
from external suppliers, predominantly from best-cost countries. However, to cope 
with the strong GTF-related demand and deliveries, MTU is ramping-up its 
production heavily between 2018 and 2020. In 2018 alone, an internal capacity 
increase of 20% will be achieved; as observed historically in this industry, every 
ramp-up comes with its problems. Management has also warned about potential 
issues during last year’s investor presentation. We are aware of it, especially 
considering the new technology and newly introduced production processes, 
hence we incorporate a significant (negative) effect on the EBIT in our valuation 
until 2020, but especially for 2018. We may see lower than expected revenues not 
fully compensating for increased COGS (fixed part) if expected output is not met. 
On the other hand, economies of scale are very likely to kick in the next few years. 
                                                 
44 Orders placed today are expected to be produced in 2020F or later. Until then, production capacity is fully required to fulfil existing GTF 
backlog  
45 OEM peer group includes: GE Aviation, GKN Aerospace, IHI Corp., Pratt & Whitney (unit of United Technologies), Rolls-Royce (Civil 
Aerospace division), Safran (Aerospace Propulsion segment). Due to the more diversified product portfolios of competitors and the 
different production cycles, it is not possible to further separate competitor’s costs and clearly compare them with MTU’s ones. Therefore, 
our cost comparison constitutes only an approximation to MTUs closest competitors 
While in 2017 MTU and PW 
delivered 374 GTF engines, the 
ramp-up will almost double the 
output for 2018 in which the 
company expects to deliver 
around 700 engines. In 2019, 
1,000 deliveries are expected. 
After 2020, a stable production 
rate of roughly 1,100 engines is 
expected 
 
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
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We expect unit costs on the COGS level to start decreasing already in 2018F, in 
accordance with MTUs guidance. Given utilization rates which are currently 
slightly lower on the GTF compared to the LEAP, PW may need to further 
increase discounts on new GTF sales to curb demand. This, however, will have an 
even further negative impact in MTU’s EBIT. As of today, we don’t expect 
significant impacts, but keep a close eye on it. Additionally, the takeover of 
Bombardier’s C-Series by Airbus (A220) may result in some pressure on 
suppliers, including MTU.  
 
In the mid-to-long-term we see favorable developments in cost reductions. As 
mentioned above, in its Munich facility, MTU is strongly increasing production 
automation. What is more, the company’s additive manufacturing capabilities have 
reached a state in which it is able to implement it in series production46. 
Nonetheless, it is still in very early stages such that only non-critical parts such as 
eyepieces used in MRO can be produced in series. Nonetheless, we expect some 
cost gains mainly via material savings given less material consumption. However, 
complex parts such as airfoils and blades are only expected to be produced under 
this technology in the long-term (i.e.: after 2030) - hence not incorporated given 
the degree of uncertainty in terms of materiality and timing. Moreover, even 
though commodity prices are highly relevant for MTU, with the current market 
situation and development expectations, we don’t see a significant risk there. We 
believe Safran’s decision to discontinue commodity (nickel, platinum and oil) 
hedging against fluctuations in 2016 shows how immaterial they are, thereby 
confirming our view. Nevertheless, MTU minimizes its risk mainly through 
commodity sales contracts and to a small extent through hedging of nickel prices 
on a 3-year basis. We assume that any price increases above this horizon can be 
compensated on the revenue side (passed on to customers).  
 
All in all, our estimates imply lower EBIT margins in the next two fiscal years, with 
the economies of scale and normalized production yielding higher margins after 
2020. Naturally, we expect OEM margins above MRO in the long-term, which 
goes against what was observed in the past, and as previously mentioned is tied 
to the shift in business model in this segment. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Since 2003, MTU has engaged in developing additive manufacturing solutions that could be incorporated in all processes and units 
ranging from engine component research to production to maintenance 
On the GTF, MTU completed its 
learning curve after only 250 
engines, which are now 
produced at high automation 
levels – therefore limited further 
cost improvements 
Graph 35 – Change in unit 
productions by type of engine part 
Source: Adapted from MTU 
Graph 37 - OEM COGS & EBIT margins
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
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Maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) 
segment 
As of 2018, the global engine MRO market amounts to USDbn 32.7 in revenues 
and is expected to grow by c.61% over the next 10 years to USDbn 52.6. North 
America, Asia-Pacific (excl. China and India) and the Middle East represent 
almost 2/3 of the market today. In accordance with ongoing (and expected) global 
fleet growth, the engine MRO market will massively expand in China (+245%), 
Latin America (+93%), Western Europe (+60%) and India (+50%)47. While mature 
markets (Europe and North America) have an installed capacity that can be 
efficiently expanded, fast-growing markets (especially APAC, China, India and 
LATAM), require high investments in new facilities, equipment, tooling and 
training, which requires time and significant capital commitments. Therefore – in 
the short-term – we expect capacity constraints in these regions, which would 
likely result in redirecting maintenance needs to mature markets. MTU has an 
early-mover advantage here, with some spare capacity left in its Chinese facility48 
as well as worldwide locations.  
 
Naturally, demand for MRO grows in line with new aircraft fleet, but usually with a 
lag of 6 to 7 years after a new engine piece enters into service. In line with strong 
narrow-body demand, the future MRO market will be dominated by this segment, 
representing around 55% in market share in 2028F (c.USDbn 29). The A320neo 
family (which is highly relevant for MTU) and B737 MAX will constitute a major 
part of the market.  
MRO market structure 
The engine MRO market has been undergoing a structural change in recent 
years, with the (ii) showing strong commitment to increase their aftermarket 
presence (due to it is high-margin attractiveness) thereby forcing traditional 
service providers – (iii) and (iv) - to reposition themselves. Moreover, new engines 
are usually sold at a loss (for the OEM) with aftermarket then providing a lucrative 
business for the engine programs through high margin spare parts and 
maintenance. By owning intellectual property (IP), OEMs can control the spare 
parts market through usage restrictions and price increases, as well as engine 
manuals and training which is required for qualification of maintenance shops, 
managers and technicians. Therefore, OEMs have lately increased repatriation 
                                                 
47 Oliver Wyman 2018-2028 fleet and MRO forecast 
48 MTU operates an engine maintenance facility in Zhuhai, China, under a JV with China Southern Air Holding Company; it specializes in 
market-leading engine platforms (e.g.: IAE V2500 and CFM56); capacity increased by 50% in 2012 and the Company – together with its 
JV partner – has pledged to invest in an additional 50% capacity increase in the next years, for which we account for in our projections 
Graph 38 - Engine MRO market 
size in USDbn – 2018E vs. 2028E 
Source: Oliver Wyman 
Graph 39 – Engine MRO spending 
CAGR – 2018E-2028E 
Source: Oliver Wyman 
Historically, the engine MRO 
market was composed by: 
 
(i) In-house airline shops 
or third-party airline MRO shops 
(Lufthansa Technik) 
(ii) OEMs (GE, RR or PW) 
(iii) OEM-affiliated MRO 
providers (MTU or Safran) 
(iv) Independent MRO shops (ST 
Engineering) 
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and buy-back of IP, therefore increasing pressure on (iii) and (iv) to step up. All in 
all, this has made non-OEM affiliated, independent and in-house MROs less 
attractive – and the trend is expected to continue in the long run – with OEMs 
squeezing out non-OEM affiliated MROs from the market49. Nevertheless, in the 
very short-term, strong demand growth in engine MRO will require capacity from 
independent shops, as executives from GE and RR have recently stated. But this 
should only yield – at most – a brief survival for small independent MROs50. Larger 
in-house shops are expected to remain on the market covering around 20% of 
engine MRO in the future51. In order to sustain or gain market share, they engage 
in partnerships with OEMs or OEM-affiliated MROs. MTU is well positioned to ride 
this trend, with the most recent engine programs (e.g.: GTF) already incorporating 
long-term maintenance and aftermarket partnerships with market-leading OEMs 
(GE and PW).  
Impressive positioning in (i) independent MRO and rising 
share in (ii) OEM-cooperation 
In the first segment, MTU is the world’s largest independent MRO provider, 
offering customized services to more than 900 clients with over 15,000 
experienced shop52 visits in its 35 years of operations. Overall, it has the largest 
engine portfolio offering a full-service range including engine leasing, on-wing 
support, repairs and engine condition monitoring (“MTU Total Care”), thereby 
capturing a 10% market share in 201653. The portfolio includes the most popular 
narrow-body and wide-body engines such as the CF34 of which currently 4,960 
units are in service, the CFM56 (21,130), the GE90 (2,114) as well as the V2500 
(5,960)54. This segment is characterized by comparatively higher margins (EBIT 
margins ~10%) in contrast to OEM-affiliated MRO (low to mid-single digit EBIT 
margin). Acknowledging the increasing OEM-cooperation trend, MTU has followed 
suit via engaging in MRO networks with OEMs across several aircraft engine 
programs, especially including partnerships for recent or in-development engines 
(GTF, GEnx and GE9X are good examples) which have long-term maintenance 
contracts embedded. This provides MTU with early provisioning and scheduling of 
cash flow dynamics as well as capacity and investment needs - driven by firm and 
expected workload amounts. In fact, 80% of new generation engines are expected 
                                                 
49 The market exit for these players can take three forms: (i) full close-down of shops; (ii) acquisition by larger OEM-integrated MRO 
providers or OEMs themselves; (iii) as a surviving strategy: shift in business model – engage in partnerships or IP/technology-sharing 
agreements with MRO providers. MTU has engaged in the (iii) to preserve its relationship with large and established OEMs, thereby 
securing its market positioning and long-term prospects, despite the lower operating margins in this newer model 
50 www.mro-network.com/engines-engine-systems/engine-makers-share-views-role-independent-mrot 
51 www.mro-network.com/maintenance-repair-overhaul/independent-mros-must-adapt-survive 
52 One shop visit corresponds to “one engine maintained” 
53 MTU, Investor Presentation September 2018 
54 FlightGlobal 2017 
A recent survey by Oliver 
Wyman of aircraft MRO provider 
has shown that 76% of IP MROs 
require for their operations is 
owned by OEMs 
 
As an example of OEMs’ 
increasing competitive 
pressure, small in-house shops 
have been discontinuing their 
MRO operations 
 
Finnair was a turnaround 
moment in this market 
transformation and its impact 
on smaller or non-OEM affiliated 
shops, having divested its 
maintenance division to GA 
Telesis in 2012 (one of the 
largest independent providers) 
 
Lufthansa Technik is yet 
another example of this shift, 
although on the positive side, 
having advanced in market 
share via partnering with key 
engine OEMs (including the 
GTF, side by side with MTU) 
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to be sold along with these contracts55, hence MTU can counterweigh implicit 
lower operating margins with better working capital dynamics. 
Location strategy – Shift towards best-cost countries to 
strengthen positioning in important markets; helps tackling rising 
labor costs 
As of now, MTU operates six MRO facilities in Germany, Canada, Malaysia (JV 
with LH Technik) and China (JV with China Southern). Additionally, it is opening a 
new shop (JV with LH Technik) in 2020, in Poland, exclusively for the GTF family. 
In China, MTU is the number one MRO provider focusing on narrow-body V2500 
and CFM56 engines. Over the next 10 years it is planning to increase its capacity 
by 50% to around 450 shop visits and enlarge its engine portfolio56. This will allow 
MTU to help serving rising demand and strengthen its positioning in the region. 
While regional capacity constraints in the short-term can be fulfilled at other 
locations given some spare capacity left, in the long-term we expect MTU will be 
required to invest in new facilities (e.g. Latin America) or further extend existing 
ones e.g. in Zhuhai (or even Poland further). Operating its own facilities allows 
MTU to not only meet demand for OEM-affiliated orders, but also to profit from 
new potential customers in the higher-margin independent segment. Therefore, 
we project increased CAPEX in the short-term until 2020 due to required 
investments of USDm 150 per partner (total required CAPEX between 2017 and 
2020) in Poland, as well as the mentioned capacity increases in China57.  
MRO revenue projections58 
As the overall MRO segment is mainly dependent on (the high) worldwide engine 
output, we forecast book-to-bill ratios to be constantly above 1, especially because 
MTU is able to capture a large overall engine market through independent work.  
 
For 2018F we expect revenues to be up by c. 20% (organic) followed by c. 17% 
and c. 10% in 2019F and 2020F, respectively. The main revenue drivers in the 
short-term (2018F – 2020F) are the V2500 and CFM5659 (independent work) on 
the A320ceo and B737NG which predominantly come into overhaul age. The 
active fleet equipped with it is on average around 8.5/9 years old. Therefore, 
future demand within the next 7-10 years is highly robust (half of the 6,000 V2500 
engines in active fleet are on their 1st run with no shop visit yet). The overall 
                                                 
55 www.mro-network.com/maintenance-repair-overhaul/independent-mros-must-adapt-survive 
56 MTU Company Presentation September 2018 
57 We develop further on this in the following section on company-level investments 
58 We forecast revenues in MTU’s China and Poland facilities separately from consolidated MRO revenues 
59 In total, there are c. 21,500 commercial CFM56 engines in operation (FlightGlobal FleetWatch 2017; excl. parked aircraft) 
Over the next 10 years, MTU will 
double its capacity in best-cost 
countries from 30% to 50%. In the 
long-run, MRO growth will be 
focused in best-cost locations 
helping MTU to position itself in 
important growth markets help 
tackle profitability headwinds 
 
Despite this focus, MTU will 
sustain a large share of its MRO 
business in high-cost countries 
such as Canada or Germany 
 
Currently, MTU holds an 85% 
share in the high-pressure 
compressor for the GTF engines, 
but could acquire the remaining 
15% in the future, as confirmed 
by MTUs investor relations team 
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
Graph 41 - BTB and Burn Rates - MRO
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capacity in the consolidated income statement will stay more or less constant in 
the future, so we keep burn rates stable (0.49 in 2018F and 0.47 after 2021F). 
 
The strongest revenue growth will come from Zhuhai given the future demand, 
location strategy and ramp-up, with revenue growth constantly above 10% in the 
projection period. As in the consolidated income statement, huge MRO needs for 
the V2500 and CFM56 engines drive revenue in the short term (c.27% in 2018F 
and c. 24% in 2019F). The ramp-up pushes burn rates up to a max. level of 0.6 in 
the projection period (up from 0.5 in 2017A).  
 
All in all, organic revenue CAGR 2017A – 2027F is expected at c. 9% in the 
consolidated income statement and 19% in Zhuhai, China.  
The cost side – Intentions to tackle shrinking margins and 
rising labor costs 
Within the MRO segment, MTU has been performing at a similar fashion as its 
closest peers60, with EBIT margins tightly catching up in the last three years, 
showing MTU’s increased focus on operating performance-benchmarking in MRO 
as well. As mentioned, the ongoing industry trend towards low-margin OEM-
cooperation61 will put pressure on operating margins. As of today, MTUs portfolio 
consists of 30% OEM cooperation and 70% independent work. This split will 
develop to 50/50 in the mid-to-long-term, particularly driven by strong GTF sales 
which are sold with lifetime OEM-cooperation contracts62. Overall, the EBIT 
margin in this business are approx. 3% to 4%. What is more, new contracts are 
predominantly based on flight hour agreements (FHAs), shifting cost responsibility 
to the MRO provider in case of unpredicted shop visits, complications during 
maintenance or more than planned spare part requirements63. The share of such 
contracts has developed from around 30% in 2004 to 60% today. For GTF 
engines, contracts are even 80% based on FHAs. MTU and PW incorporated 
these factors in the development of the GFT family, therefore being able to tackle 
potential cost issues and improve profitability. Essentially, the whole design 
                                                 
60 Suppliers in the A&D sector often focus on several channels of the supply chain, different components and regional markets, therefore 
not disclosing relevant financial data for each sub-segment. MTU focuses solely on engine maintenance whereas virtually all its peers 
perform maintenance on airframe, interiors, engine components, systems, avionics etc. Nonetheless, the end-market is the same. 
Therefore, we consider Lufthansa Technik, ST Engineering and AirFrance/KLM (aircraft and engine maintenance division) to be the most 
reasonable competitors, constituting the MRO peer group for operational benchmarking purposes 
61 Essentially, MTU has comparable costs to independent MRO work but receives lower revenues from OEM partners, resulting in lower 
operating margins. OEMs are contract holders and subcontract MRO at transfer prices to MTU which is required to source spare parts at 
list prices, which increases its material cost burden, therefore driving margins further down 
62 According to Matthias Spies, Senior Manager of IR at MTU, contacted by the team in June 2018 
63 Flight hour agreements: Essentially, maintenance contracts are developed on an hourly basis which is clearly positive for airline 
operators that face fixed maintenance costs, but negative for MRO operators as they might face increased/unexpected maintenance or 
spare parts costs; this obviously constitutes an additional profitability barrier.The GP7000 and GEnx, already operating for a while with 
some MRO activity have been sold under OEM-cooperation and FHA agreements 
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
Graph 43 - Organic revenue and 
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concept behind the GTF family64 was to design an engine solution that requires 
less maintenance – mainly due to simpler architecture (read: fewer parts). Indeed, 
compared to its predecessor (V2500) – GTF yields c.15% maintenance cost 
savings; this puts MTU in a significant competitive advantage vis-à-vis its direct 
competitor in the narrow-body segment – CFM’s LEAP – which reportedly has the 
same maintenance costs as the CFM56 (predecessor). Additionally, MTU 
capitalizes on predictive analytics and real-time engine monitoring which allows to 
decrease the number of unscheduled shop-visits and increase on-wing time. As a 
conclusion, we expect that the Company will be able to keep costs under control, 
but margins will definitely stand lower than what investors observed in the past. 
 
Moreover, the industry has been experiencing a trend of critically rising wages. 
97% of those surveyed by Oliver Wyman65 confirm they have experienced upward 
pressures on technician wages, mainly due to a lack of supply and global wage 
inflation – trends which are not expected to be resolved in the near future. The 
Company designed a two-sided strategy to tackle the problem: firstly, its relocation 
strategy oriented to best-cost countries allows it to get a grip on rising personnel 
costs. Certainly, developing economies also experience labor shortages and rising 
wages; nonetheless, salary levels are much more favorable and are not expected 
to reach levels of developed countries in a foreseeable future. Secondly, its 
Industry 4.0 program (especially data analytics, predictive maintenance and 
automation) has started generating improvements in labor productivity; the 
Company has shown signs of maintaining R&D levels to support this type of intra-
company development, and we view this as an on-going trend. 
 
Hence, we account for slightly higher COGS (materials and personnel) – reflecting 
the two abovementioned factors, which we believe MTU is able to tackle – but 
only up to a certain point. On the SG&A side, as a result of the partial shift towards 
OEM-cooperation, we have been observing a decreasing trend from 5.3% to 2.6% 
of revenues in the last five years. Indeed, as the company locks-in contracts and 
secures revenue and cash flows for very long periods in the future, it does not 
require the same level of sales and marketing efforts as before. Nonetheless, we 
assume the level reached in 2017 to be the bottom as the company is stil engaged 
in independent MRO (recall 50/50 split). Moreover, as with the recent past, there 
is still some spare capacity expected to be left at the end of the next years for 
which we expect some sales activity. All in all, implicit in our cost assumptions, 
EBIT margin is expected to sequentially contract until 2023F, recovering in the 
following five years to achieve a level that is relatively in line with its historical and 
                                                 
64 The core revenue driver – starting in 2022/2023 – when MRO needs will start kicking in aggressively 
65 MRO Survey 2018: Tackling Industry Disruption – Oliver Wyman  
Graph 45 - MRO COGS & EBIT margins
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates
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peer group performance by 2027F, clearly reflecting a strong execution of the 
above-mentioned strategy.  
Investments and working capital 
dynamics66 
MTU’s operating cycle can be described by sequential investment and 
consolidation phases, whereby in the first it engages in significant intangible and 
fixed asset investments to acquire or upgrade machinery, equipment, tools and 
materials, increase space and capacity, acquire program stakes in engine 
programs, etc. In the following phase, the goal is to capitalize on the investments, 
ramp-up production, reach maximum capacity utilization and serve demand from 
end-customers – usually aircraft OEMs and leasing companies. Hence, the levels 
of invested capital, NOPLAT and asset turnover shift considerably in between 
these cycles.  
 
MTUs working capital (WC) metrics have worsened over the years - especially 
since 2013. Its cash conversion cycle (CCC) increased from 29 days to 97 days in 
the 5-year period. According to the company, the main reason lies in significantly 
increased prepayments for inventories in the military division for the Eurofighter 
and TP400 production. At the same time, the CCC has converged to the peer 
median, and is still much better than the CCC of its closest competitor Safran (114 
days). MTU indicated it will decrease prepayments and improve inventory turns 
during the consolidation phase. Furthermore, with its Logistics 4.0 project, MTU 
will be able to increase on-time delivery in the mid-to-long term. Also considering 
in-house additive manufacturing activities, we forecast a further decrease in WC in 
the mid-to-long term. Overall, we model a decrease in the CCC to around 93.6 
days by 2027F keeping it stable as of then. This is based on a continuous 
decrease of prepayments predominantly in the military segment increasing DPO 
to 88.3 days. Additionally, we expect an improvement in DIO starting in 2021F due 
to increased inventory turns and released pressure related to the ramp-up.  
Regarding fixed investments, contrarily to what we expected before the Investor & 
Analyst Day in November, we now account for significant (and necessary) 
investments in capacity across several facilities, apart from those already well-
known (Zhuhai, EME Aero). Indeed, management announced that (especially on 
the back of increased Airbus production rates, increased V2500 MRO demand, as 
well as the higher commercial success of the GTF) the company will have to 
elevate CAPEX efforts for a few years down the road, spicing this consolidation 
                                                 
66 Given the lack of balance sheet data for OEM and MRO, and in order to avoid unreasonable and ungrounded breakdowns, we 
proceed to project investment needs on a group-level basis  
Source: Company, Analyst estimates
Graph 46 - Historical asset turnover 
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phase with significant cash outlays to space and machinery to couple with 
demand. As a result, we expect ROIC to decrease slightly in 2018F from its 2017 
level of 12%, to 9.5%; value creation potential should stabilize at slightly lower 
levels by 2025 (c.9 %) – this reflects our view of an industry that’s undergoing 
significant technological changes, requiring severe investments, as well as 
elevated levels of working capital to meet production needs. Graph 48 shows how 
MTU’s ROIC develops (again) in between cycles; however, the last consolidation 
cycle was described by highly significant capital returns from the V2500 program, 
which did not require the same level of investments by MTU as the GTF did (and 
still does). Hence, the team does not see the Company achieving previously-seen 
levels hovering around 18-19% average between 2007 and 2011, and rather 
forecast a lower ROIC, which reflects higher investment needs that come with 
participation in such a significant engine program, very much required for MTU to 
“stay relevant” in the industry, now and in the long-term 
Capital structure and cost of capital 
Given the industry nature and need to pre-finance program shares by large 
amounts of debt, the D/E ratio fluctuates widely over time67. MTUs comps do not 
only acquire different program shares but also operate in other (additional) 
engines programs, aircraft parts and industries, so that the cycles and levels may 
naturally deviate68. 
 
Importantly, MTU states a target leverage of 1x (Net Debt/EBITDA)69 which we 
assume to be approached by the end of the consolidation phase in order to have a 
good debt capacity to invest in a new engine program. Nevertheless, it doesn’t 
intend to deleverage the company too much70, so we interpret the target leverage 
as the bottom. MTU has confirmed that it will do so by increasing its payout policy 
from today around 30% to 40% after 2018/2019 – gradually. Historically, the 
Company has been maintaining a dividend friendly policy constantly increasing 
dividend per share based on strong net income growth. Despite the fluctuating 
debt behavior, we’re confident about MTUs overall capital structure, financial 
stability and liquidity, thus bearing no significant risk71. Moreover, Moody’s rates 
MTU with a Baa3 and stable outlook, further supporting our view72. 
 
                                                 
67 Typically, the industry standard is to finance large program acquisitions by debt. For example, MTU issued a corporate bond in 2012 to 
finance its program share in IAE (V2500 engine) 
68 Therefore, a comparison over time doesn’t deliver reasonable results. 
69 MTU AR 2017 IR Presentation (February 2018) 
70 CFO commentary according to MTU AR 2017 IR Presentation (February 2018) transcript 
71 An analysis of MTUs capital structure and financial stability since 2006A yields the same results 
72 www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-changes-outlook-on-MTU-Aero-Engines-AGs-Baa3-rating--PR_380580 
Source: Company, Analyst estimates
Graph 48 - ROIC vs WACC
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Risk-free rate
B
e
ta
 
Cost of Capital 
We use a risk-free rate of 0.31% which is based on the current German 10-year 
government bond yield. MTUs beta (1.01) is based on a 2-year weekly regression 
vis-à-vis the MSCI World Index. The 2-year rolling beta has been fairly stable 
showing a 6.45% standard deviation. Moreover, the result is in line with MTUs 
comps median beta (0.96) and average (0.96). For the market risk premium, we 
assume 4.77%73. As a result, we arrive at a cost of equity of 4.79%74. Given the 
potential changes in the risk-free rate in the near future the following table 
provides a sensitivity analysis on the cost of equity. 
 
MTU has only one non-traded registered convertible bond outstanding. Therefore, 
cost of debt (2.53%) is based on the risk-free rate on top of a default spread of 
2.22% according to MTUs Moody’s rating (Baa3) with a stable outlook. The target 
capital structure used in the WACC (4.26%) is based on an average capital 
structure of global aerospace and defense companies75. Table 3 provides a 
comparison of MTUs target and current capital structure.  
Valuation 
Our SOTP valuation separately encompasses MTU’s core business (DCF), its two 
key joint ventures (Zhuhai and EME Aero; Cash Flow to Equity), as well as its 
remaining non-operating assets and liabilities (composed of goodwill, investments 
in associates and financial assets; Book Value); Graph 51 provide a summary of 
the valuation results. Our DCF methodology is based on a 10-year explicit horizon 
allowing for significant flexibility to account for varying margin, growth and 
investment assumptions during the different investment and consolidation phases. 
The continuing value relies on a base-year NOPLAT of €552m by 2028, tied to an 
expected 1.9% long-term growth rate and a WACC of 4.3% as mentioned above, 
which we link directly to the company’s long-term capacity of creating value from 
new invested capital. Indeed, our vision of MTU in the current context and in the 
next 10-15 years is marked by its ability to hold a competitive advantage, allowing 
for significant value creation. Nonetheless, it is hard to picture how the company 
will perform in future engine programs in the very long term, in an industry where 
                                                 
73 Historical MRP from 1928 to 2017 based on a geometric average of S&P500 and 10-year US treasury bond 
74 Based on CAPM model 
75 A. Damodaran's "Global Capital Structure Ratios"; Updated as of January 2018; Global-level (#firms=229) 
Table 2: Regression results
Beta 1,01
Low er bound 0,96
Upper bound 1,06
Adjusted beta 1,00
Standard error 0,02
R-squared 0,29
Source: Bloomberg, Analyst Estimates
Cost of equity 4,79%
Cost of debt 2,53%
After-tax cost of operating leases 2,68%
E/EV 81,92%
D/EV 15,97%
Capitalized operating leases/EV 2,11%
Statutory tax rate 32,20%
WACC 4,26%
MTUs current capital structure
E/EV 87,23%
D/EV 10,11%
COL/EV 2,66%
Source: MTU, Bloomberg, Analyst Estimates
Table 3: MTUs target capital structure 
and CoC
Graph 51 - EV to Equity bridge
Source: Analyst estimates
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technology, design and engineering change very often, and are crucial for 
companies’ competitive success. Naturally, entry of new players is largely not 
expected, but the few existing players have been competing intensely on many 
levels. As a clear example - recent news reporting that GE and UTC are looking to 
definitely break itself apart would result in much more focused GE Aviation and 
Pratt & Whitney units, which could either harm or strengthen MTU’s competitive 
situation.  
Moreover, as a measure to sense-check our intrinsic valuation results, a focused 
yet unusual peer group76 is taken into account to derive relative implied 
valuations77. EV/EBIT is - in our view - the most relevant metric to watch in this 
highly capital-intensive industry, uncovering asset efficiency deviations across 
peers; moreover, the “lease vs. own” choices may also deviate significantly using 
other common metrics such as EV/EBITDA. The peer group includes both key 
MTU competitors, partners and end-clients, as they all are exposed to the same 
industry dynamics and external environment, facing very similar long-term growth 
prospects and exposure to external developments and effects. 
 
 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Based on our sensitivity analysis we are mainly concerned about two variables 
which may considerably influence the valuation. While a change in the continuing 
value growth rate has a rather low effect, a change in the WACC and especially 
FX rate, affect our valuation significantly. Particularly an increase in the discount 
rate we see as very likely to happen soon due to changing monetary policies as 
well as macroeconomic dynamics happening in the most relevant and developed 
markets78. A 10-cent increase in the EUR/USD rate in the continuing value, for 
example, destroys around 5.5% in value (table 4), Despite the current pressure on 
the USD, looking back at the historical exchange rate, this scenario seems to be 
                                                 
76 Rolls-Royce, Safran, Senior, Meggitt, Airbus and Boeing 
77 Market data taken into account is based on peers’ -3m average trading prices as of 22 December 2018. Looking-forward estimates 
were obtained using FactSet aggregate consensus from several accredited research analysts and are all adjusted for non-
recurring/immaterial events and effects. Moreover, the bridge items (EV-EqV) were calculated by the team by inspecting the companies’ 
latest quarterly/semi-annual reports 
78 We provide a sensitivity analysis on the risk-free rate and some key facts on our view on the trend of the risk-free rate in the cost of 
capital section 
Graph 51 - Football Field (Part II)
Metric
DCF @ WACC 3.8% - 4.8% (Enterprise Value)
EV / Sales 2019e 1,18x - 2,63x
EV / EBIT 2019e 13,8x - 23,0x
P / E 2019e 16,3x - 34,4x
DCF @ WACC 3.8% - 4.8% (Equity Value)
Source: Analyst estimates
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Base-case share price (2019E) Growth rate
1,15% 1,40% 1,65% 1,90% 2,15% 2,40% 2,65%
3,36% 255,6 256,3 257,0 257,6 258,3 259,0 259,7
3,66% 231,7 232,3 232,9 233,6 234,2 234,8 235,5
3,96% 211,5 212,0 212,6 213,2 213,7 214,3 214,9
4,26% 194,1 194,6 195,1 195,7 196,2 196,7 197,3
4,56% 179,0 179,5 180,0 180,5 181,0 181,5 182,0
4,86% 165,8 166,3 166,7 167,2 167,7 168,2 168,6
5,16% 154,2 154,6 155,1 155,5 155,9 156,4 156,8
W
A
C
C
rather possible. Finally, the burn rate in the CV can have a significant impact as 
well. A 10% increase/decrease creates / destroys c. 13% in value (table 5). In our 
view, it certainly is possible that the burn rate may change in the future. 
Nonetheless, we don’t expect this driver to deviate significantly from our forecast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario analysis – GTF as the prime 
valuation factor79 
As mentioned across the note, we implicitly and explicitly mention the GTF as a 
key part of MTU’s equity story. Indeed, 2017 was already an eventful year, 2018 
is on its way to be so as well, but we expect 2019 and 2020 to be decisive years. 
Indeed, on both sides of the spectrum, the program can be a major success and 
achieve a higher-than-expected market share vs. the LEAP, or it can also enter 
successive operating disruptions, causing potential (undecided) clients to flee for 
the CFM-designed engine solution. Hence, we are confident that a structured 
approach to model these two scenarios is highly relevant, so as to incorporate 
extreme up and down-side scenarios in the valuation. Our approach is based on 
a qualitative analysis of the abovementioned market dynamics and their impact 
on the team’s base forecasts in the explicit period80. 
 
 
                                                 
79 Based on 2019F target price (TP) 
80 We assume that the military segment would be left unchanged for these scenarios as it solely focuses on GTF market share 
success/failure – again: key part of MTU’s valuation; moreover, its lack of strategic focus both for the company and the market led the 
team to classify it as much less material compared to the commercial OEM and maintenance divisions 
Base-case Total EV (2019E) Growth rate
13 299 1,15% 1,40% 1,65% 1,90% 2,15% 2,40% 2,65%
3,36% 16 623 16 661 16 698 16 736 16 774 16 812 16 851
3,66% 15 298 15 332 15 366 15 400 15 435 15 471 15 506
3,96% 14 175 14 206 14 237 14 269 14 301 14 334 14 367
4,26% 13 211 13 240 13 269 13 299 13 329 13 359 13 389
4,56% 12 376 12 403 12 430 12 457 12 485 12 513 12 542
4,86% 11 645 11 670 11 695 11 721 11 747 11 774 11 800
5,16% 11 000 11 023 11 047 11 072 11 096 11 121 11 146
W
A
C
C
Source: MTU, analyst estimate
Graph 53 - Book-to-bill development 
(OEM)
 0,50
 0,70
 0,90
 1,10
 1,30
 1,50
 1,70
 1,90
Base Upside Downside
FX rate EV Share price
1,0 15,1 224,0
1,1 14,1 208,6
1,2 13,3 195,7
1,3 12,6 184,7
1,4 12,0 175,4
Burn rate EV Share price
80% 10,5 144,7
90% 11,9 170,2
100% 13,3 195,7
110% 14,7 221,1
120% 16,1 246,6
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis  - 
FX rate EUR/USD
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis  - 
Burn rate
Source: Analyst estimate
Note: EV in EURbn; share price 
in EUR
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Upside case: MTU successfully captures higher 
narrow body market share /GTF) vs. The LEAP 
In a world where the LEAP sequentially loses market share on currently 
undecided customers and future orders, GTF partners such as MTU widely stand 
to benefit from positive synergies coming from – especially – significantly higher 
OEM and MRO revenue growth (as a result of stronger demand reflected in higher 
BTB ratios). Nonetheless, the increased market share requires significant capital 
commitments in new production and maintenance facilities; also, in the short-term, 
negative impacts are highly likely due to an even stronger ramp-up in production. 
As a result, FCF would be significantly negative in the first years. Moreover, the 
company would see its MRO business shift even more towards OEM-cooperation 
business, assuming it would be unable to service independent work at the same 
level, as it would have to comply with long-term commitments for new engines, 
which as previously mentioned yields lower operating margins. Hence, in this 
extremely positive scenario, we forecast constantly higher BTB ratios across OEM 
and MRO divisions starting precisely in 2018F, reflecting short-term order 
announcements for GTF-powered A320neos, which would not only reflect engine 
production demand as well as long-term MRO contract commitments, which would 
obviously impact the size of MRO backlog as well; the impact on revenue growth 
would be clear on both segments, with significantly higher revenue CAGRs across 
the whole explicit period (9.2% for MRO and 8.9% for OEM vs. 7.7% and 6.6% in 
the base-case scenario). All in all, returns on capital commitments since 2012A 
would be higher, with ROIC reaching a level of 9.4% in 2027F, even accounting 
for the significant investment commitments that we reflect in CAPEX and 
intangibles projections. Moreover, given the superior commercial position 
hypothetically achieved under this scenario, there would be more reasons to 
believe that MTU could hold a significant long-term competitive advantage, 
therefore we adjust RONIC upwards (above WACC) in the CV assumptions. 
Downside case: GTF loses share to the LEAP and 
MTU captures limited narrow body growth 
On the other side of the spectrum, another scenario to consider would involve 
MTU seeing its share of the narrow body demand growth severely hindered. As a 
result, we model significant BTB reductions on both OEM and MRO, reflecting 
worsening demand compared to the base case scenario. Moreover, investment 
needs as well as ramp-up costs would be significantly reduced, therefore 
positively impacting short-term outlook for FCF. Nonetheless, the reduced market 
share and commercial position would result in lower ROIC over the explicit period, 
meaning that MTU would fail to capitalize on its GTF-related investments since 
Graph 54 – Book-to-bill 
development (MRO) 
Source: MTU, analyst estimate 
Graph 55 – ROIC development 
(group-level) 
Source: MTU, analyst estimate 
Source: MTU, Analyst Estimates 
Graph 56 – Cash Conversion Cycle 
(nº days) across scenarios 
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2012, as well as the on-going ones (including capacity increases in Zhuhai and 
on-going investment in Poland).  
Overview of valuation results81 
All in all, our scenario projections imply a core EV range from EURbn 10.1 to 
13.4bn, where the latter consists in an extreme scenario implying a 24% premium 
to our base-case share price of EUR 195.7 and the former a discount of 12%. We 
model a probabilistic approach to these scenarios, accounting for an equal, yet 
small probability for both the extreme scenarios, arriving at a final weighted target 
price (YE 2019) of EUR 197.4. 
Final valuation considerations – last 
remarks 
There is a myriad of factors impacting our view of MTU that go far beyond engine 
OEM and MRO market mechanics, competition and program success/failures. As 
initially described, the entire engine production and maintenance market strongly 
depends – with certain exceptions – on the end customers. These are mainly 
airlines that source aircraft from Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, etc. As widely known 
and experienced, airlines are strongly exposed to many macro and micro factors 
that are often interrelated. Moreover, the commercial positioning that MTU will be 
able to maintain or achieve is naturally also a crucial aspect. Indeed, future 
partnerships, engagements and investments in engine programs are key for both 
OEM and MRO activities. Moreover, Industry 4.0 pinpoints a turning point for the 
broad manufacturing industry, where the A&D sector is riding as a top innovator, 
therefore MTU will have to allocate resources to remain technologically 
competitive. We are confident that a thorough analysis of these factors would 
strengthen an assessment of MTU. Therefore, a more detailed overview of some 
of the abovementioned drivers will be discussed in depth, as per the following 
attachments: “Final valuation considerations, Parts 1/2 and 2/2”. 
                                                 
81 Share prices across scenarios based on 2019F TPs 
Core Enterprise Value 10 093
Net Debt (1 076)
Operating Subsidiaries 1 294
Net non-operating assets 640
Other EV adj. (748)
Implied share price 172,5
Core Enterprise Value 11 068
Net Debt (1 085)
Operating Subsidiaries 1 591
Net non-operating assets 640
Other EV adj. (725)
Implied share price 195,7
Core Enterprise Value 13 358
Net Debt (952)
Operating Subsidiaries 2 151
Net non-operating assets 640
Other EV adj. (1 121)
Implied share price 242,3
Scenario-weighted TP 197,4
Source: Analyst Estimates
Upside Case
Base Case
Downside Case
Graph 57 - Valuation summary (Y/E 2019)
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Disclosures and Disclaimers 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
 
 
This report was prepared by Francisco Castanho and Maksim Defer, Master in Finance students of Nova 
School of Business and Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Field Lab – Equity Research. 
This report is issued and published exclusively for academic purposes, namely for academic evaluation and 
master graduation purposes, within the context of said Field Lab – Equity Research. It is not to be construed 
as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. 
This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who 
revised the valuation methodology and the financial model. 
Given the exclusive academic purpose of the reports produced by Nova SBE students, it is Nova SBE 
understanding that Nova SBE, the author, the present report and its publishing, are excluded from the 
persons and activities requiring previous registration from local regulatory authorities. As such, Nova SBE, its 
faculty and the author of this report have not sought or obtained registration with or certification as financial 
analyst by any local regulator, in any jurisdiction. In Portugal, neither the author of this report nor his/her 
academic supervisor is registered with or qualified under COMISSÃO DO MERCADO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS 
(“CMVM”, the Portuguese Securities Market Authority) as a financial analyst. No approval for publication or 
distribution of this report was required and/or obtained from any local authority, given the exclusive academic 
nature of the report. 
The additional disclaimers also apply: 
USA: Pursuant to Section 202 (a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, neither Nova SBE nor the 
author of this report are to be qualified as an investment adviser and, thus, registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”, United States of America’s securities market authority) is not necessary. 
Neither the author nor Nova SBE receive any compensation of any kind for the preparation of the reports. 
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Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities Trading 
Act), this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should be 
noted that Nova SBE is a fully-owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s equity 
reports and any fund raising programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity to be 
a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject to prior 
authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an exclusively 
academic purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a Master’s student - is 
the sole and exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts contained herein, and for 
the opinions expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the date of the report. Nova SBE 
and its faculty have no single and formal position in relation to the most appropriate valuation method, 
estimates or projections used in the report and may not be held liable by the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept 
no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The students or Nova 
SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and recommendations expressed herein 
may change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
estimates, the resulting projections, price target and recommendations may differ widely, even when referring 
to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective opinions may lead to 
significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and recommendations, as well as 
the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with the views expressed in this report. 
Any recipient of this report should understand that statements regarding future prospects and performance 
are, by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment in the 
target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security being 
denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among private 
investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available to any 
person other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While preparing this 
report, students did not have in consideration the specific investment objectives, financial situation or  
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particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness 
of investing in any security, namely in the security covered by this report. 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the target company and its securities. He/ She has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report. 
The content of each report has been shown or made public to restricted parties prior to its publication in Nova 
SBE’s website or in Bloomberg Professional, for academic purposes such as its distribution among faculty 
members for students’ academic evaluation. 
Nova SBE is a state-owned university, mainly financed by state subsidies, students tuition fees and 
companies, through donations, or indirectly by hiring educational programs, among other possibilities. Thus, 
Nova SBE may have received compensation from the target company during the last 12 months, related to its 
fundraising programs, or indirectly through the sale of educational, consulting or research services. 
Nevertheless, no compensation eventually received by Nova SBE is in any way related to or dependent on 
the opinions expressed in this report. The Nova School of Business and Economics does not deal for or 
otherwise offer any investment or intermediation services to market counterparties, private or intermediate 
customers. 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, without the explicit previous 
consent of its author, unless when used by Nova SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, Nova SBE 
may decide to suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice. Neither this document 
nor any copy of it may be taken, transmitted or distributed, directly or indirectly, in any country either than 
Portugal or to any resident outside this country. The dissemination of this document other than in Portugal or 
to Portuguese citizens is therefore prohibited and unlawful. 
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Appendix (2/3) – Final valuation considerations (1/2) 
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Introduction 
Throughout the report we mentioned various factors influencing MTUs valuation. On the one 
hand, we argued for external factors such as economic growth and the currently low oil price and 
low interest rates. On the other hand, we stressed the success of the current engine programs MTU is 
participating in, especially the GTF. 
I would like to consider MTUs valuation on a company and business model specific level thereby 
neglecting market wide factors which have a very similar effect on the industry and main 
competitors82. Besides these market wide factors, investors in MTU have mainly reacted to issues 
with the Company’s MRO business and GTF engine. This section is a qualitative analysis into the 
main driving factor behind the scenario analysis, the success of the current GTF engine program.  
The importance of GTF sales 
MTU operates in two phases in which free cash-flows and ROIC fluctuate significantly83. The 
(1st) investment period (~5 years) in which engines are developed requires large cash-outflows. 
During the (2nd) consolidation phase (~5 years) engines are sold, however oftentimes below 
production costs due to the bilateral oligopoly and strong competition for market share84. After 
additional 6 to 7 years engines come into the MRO stage in which MTU starts to turn its investments 
/ losses from engine development and sales into profits. The ongoing shift away from independent 
MRO towards OEM-affiliated MRO lifetime contracts makes MTUs business even more dependent 
on early OEM engines sales with MTU participation. These new contracts, however, provide lower 
operating margins of around ~3-4% compared to ~8-10% for independent MRO contracts. Hence, 
economies of scale in production and MRO become even more important. Overall, project specific 
profits are oftentimes realized after more than 16 years since the first investment.  
                                                 
82 See appendix 1 
83 See page 23 
84 This is especially true for aircrafts which have more than one engine choice such as the A320neo family (GTF or LEAP) or 787 (GEnx or Trent 
1000) 
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MTUs current potential is largely skewed towards the narrow-body segment and the GTF engine. 
The narrow-body engine portfolio is largely in the aftermarket and phase-out stage85. The most 
significant engine, the V2500 of which at the moment 6,118 (FlightGlobal 2018) pieces are operated 
will largely be phased out over the next decade. Currently, there are only two engines in series 
production with one more to be launched in 201986. The PW1100G for the A320neo family has the 
most significant impact on MTUs revenues with currently 139 operated aircrafts (FlightGlobal 2018) 
and 5,716 outstanding orders87 (Airbus 2018). With a market share of c. 44% (CAPA Centre for 
Aviation 2018) on the A320neo family, MTU has a potential for c. 5,000 engines orders as of today. 
In this segment, MTU competes with the LEAP which owns the remaining 56% market share. An 
increase in MTU’s market share to (c.) 50%, as expected by the management in the long-term would 
allow for c. 700 more engine unit sales as of today.  
The wide-body portfolio is partly close to final phase-out and partly in the mid phase-out stage 
with only three88 engine types in series production. The 787 and 747-8 engines (GEnx) are currently 
in series production and are entering the after-market phase. At the moment, 1,042 GEnx engines are 
in operation (FlightGlobal 2018). With further 639 outstanding orders (Boeing 2018) for the 787 and 
a market share of c. 60% on this aircraft type, there is a potential for around 760 more engines for 
MTU. The competition for engines sales on this aircraft is currently skewed towards the GEnx given 
recent issues with the Trent 1000 (Reuters 2018). Finally, the engines for the 777X which will start 
operations in 2020 will enter the after-market stage approx. in 2027. MTU will profit from all 
aircraft orders and likely from a large part of the after-market on this aircraft as it is the sole supplier 
for it. 
                                                 
85 See appendix 2 for an overview of MTUs current narrow- and wide-body engine portfolio 
86 All three egnines are GTF type engines for different narrow-body aircrafts. Additionally, MTU participates in the PW6000 for the A318. However, 
this engine is negnectible as there are only 6 aircrafts operated (FlightGlobal 2018) with only 80 orders (Airbus 2018) 
87 Outstanding orders for the A320neo family as of November 2018 (Airbus 2018) 
88 Including the GP7000 engine for the A380 which is neglectible with only 50 expected orders over the next 10 years (Oliver Wyman 2018), resulting 
in a potential of 200 engines 
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Together with the V2500 and GEnx the PW1100G provide 3/4 of MTU’s commercial OEM 
revenues (MTU 2018)89. What is more, in addition to the current potential of the narrow-body 
segment, the segment is expected to further grow in the foreseeable future while the wide-body 
segment is forecasted to decline90. Overall, in the commercial segment future cash-flow streams will 
therefore heavily rely on the success of the GTF and its after-market and are thus highly crucial for 
MTUs valuation and future potential sales. Hence it is highly important for MTU and its partners to 
compete for higher market share on the GTF and not to further lose any as happened in the recent 
past91.  
While customers of the GTF have been positively commenting on its good fuel efficiency, it has 
drawn negative attention due to various reliability issues. As a result, the GTF has lost some market 
share from 46% to 44% (CAPE Centre for Aviation).  Lower orders or cancelations are particularly 
critical. Qatar Airways, for example, canceled its orders of 32 GTF engines and opted for 72 LEAP 
engines when it increased its order for A320neos in 2017 as a reaction of delayed deliveries due to 
technical problems with the GTF. In February 2018, MTU’s stock price dropped by ~14%92 as a 
reaction to the knife-edge seal problems which have caused some groundings and production delays 
(Airline Suppliers 2018, FlightGlobal 2018). By September 2018 the GTF experienced issues with 
increased vibrations. In order to repair the engines, PW had to ground an average of around 10 
aircrafts at one time (IndustryWeek 2018) leading to significant losses for airlines. Moreover, over 
the summer 2018 IndoGo, for example, had to ground 9 planes due to a lack of spare parts and 
replacement engines. Due to production delays in connection with technical issues of the GTF, 
Airbus delivered only half of the ordered A320neos to Lufthansa which were then be able to fly only 
50% of scheduled flights due to technical problems and lack of spare parts and replacement engines. 
                                                 
89 2017E. Given the fact that the last V2500 engine will be sold in 2019 and the GEnx has only a low quantity potential compared to the PW1100G, it 
can be expected that the GTF will be MTU’s main revenue driver. MTU confirms this view (MTU 2018) 
90 See pages 6-7 and 9-10 
91 A quantitavive analysis based on prices and costs is not possible due to unavailability of data. Unlike with aircraft prices which are publicly 
available, this is not the case for engines prices 
92 See appendix 1 
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Overall, of the 140 A320neos equipped with GTF engines, 15 were grounded (10.7%). In 
comparison, of the 205 A320neos delivered with CFM engines only 7 were grounded (3.4%) 
(Airlinewatch 2018). While MTU has not been responsible for any of these issues, these cases also 
show how heavily its stock performance relies on other program partners. So far, besides the not 
very critical lost market share and some cancelations, there haven’t been any crucial losses. Trust 
issues in such concentrated markets with high pre-financed investments, and returns realized only 
after many years can have long-term negative financial implications. Engines are not released every 
year but every 10 years or more when a new aircraft model is released and then operate for decades. 
Should an engine model fail or not attract enough buyers, there will be a (much) smaller or no 
existent market until a new aircraft model is released. What is more, highly crucial MRO sales in the 
profitable after-market phase would decrease and may not be sufficient to make up losses from 
development and sales with low or even negative margins. For MTU, depending on the extent, this 
would imply a negative project ROI with at the same time high R&D expenses as well as 
investments in e.g. program shares and production equipment for new engine models. Overall this 
will negatively impact MTU’s cash flow generation and thus the valuation for a longer-term. 
Based on current outstanding orders for the A320neo family, the 2% lost market share amount for 
only c. 230 less GTF sales for MTU. However, future sales of new GTF engine models depend to a 
certain extent on current sales. As with aircrafts, airlines largely try to align its equipment all over 
their fleet. For example, based on the good experience with their large portfolio of CFM56 engines, 
Lion Air ordered 380 LEAP engines for their new A320neo fleet in 2018 (Lion Air 2018). Based on 
this fleet alignment behavior of airlines it is important to gain a large engine customer base and 
“lock them in”. In the future, this will increase the chances of follow-up orders from existing 
customers. The large number of current outstanding orders for new aircrafts as well as the great 
market prospects for the near future make the time favorable to grow MTU’s customer base. 
Especially emerging markets in which fleets are growing tremendously constitute a very important 
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chance for the GTF. With a higher installed GTF engine fleet, MTU will be able to sustain and 
further expand its positioning in a highly competitive market in the future. 
Conclusion 
Given MTUs engine portfolio and market demand, the Company’s valuation as of today is highly 
dependent on current and future GTF sales.  
Future profitability mainly depends on the after-market phase which in turn increasingly depends 
on OEM sales. Should the recent issues with the GTF widen so that MTU and its partners miss to 
sell “enough” GTF engines, they will likely be at a disadvantage in the future after-market 
harvesting stage. Cash-flow streams will decline (significantly) for a long period until new engine 
models start generating revenues and more importantly profitability. At the same time MTU would 
need to make cash available for high R&D expenses and other required investments for future 
engine programs. As a result, the share price is likely to suffer for a longer period and investors 
might stay away from MTUs stock over this period. Additionally, lower GTF sales will likely to 
shift future engines sales to competitors, thereby additionally putting pressure on MTUs stock. 
By contrast, the effect of selling a larger number of current GTF engines will give investors more 
confidence into MTU’s stock due to (1) largely secured future positive cash-flows during the MRO 
stage as well as (2) future potential sales of flowing engine models to existing customers. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Share price development of MTU, Safran vs S&P 500 index93 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
                                                 
93 Development is only considered since MTUs IPO in 2005 
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Narrowbody engine overview
Aircraft Engine Program partners MTU program share Phase
Boeing 757, C-17 PW2000 PW, GKN Aerospace, Avio Aero 21.2% Aftermarket and phase-out
A318 PW6000 PW, Mitsubishi 18.0%
Series Production and 
Aftermarket
A320neo PW1100G - JM PW, GKN Aerospace, JAEC 18.0%
Series Production and 
Aftermarket
A319 V2500 PW, JAEC 16.0% Aftermarket and phase-out
A320 V2500 PW, JAEC 16.0% Aftermarket and phase-out
A321 V2500 PW, JAEC 16.0% Aftermarket and phase-out
Boeing MD-90 range V2500 PW, JAEC 16.0% Aftermarket and phase-out
Boeing MD-80 range JT8D - 200
PW, GKN Aerospace, 
Mitsubishi
12.5% Aftermarket and phase-out
Irkut MC-21 PW1400G PW, GKN Aerospace, JAEC 18.0% R&D phase
Bombardier C-Series PW1500G PW, GKN Aerospace, JAEC 17.0%
Series Production (recently 
launched)
Widebody engine overview
Aircraft Engine Program partners MTU program share Phase
Boeing 777X GE9x 4.0% Initial development
Boeing 767 CF6-50/80A n/a Close to final phase-out
A310 and A300 CF6-50/80A n/a Close to final phase-out
DC 10-30 CF6-50/80A n/a Close to final phase-out
A330 CF6-80E n/a Entering phase-out
Boeing 787 Dreamliner GEnx 6.6% Entering aftermarket
Boeing 747-8 GEnx 6.6% Entering aftermarket
Boeing 747-400 CF6-80C 9.1% Mid phase-out
Boeing 767 CF6-80C 9.1% Mid phase-out
A310 and 300 CF6-80C 9.1% Mid phase-out
Boeing MD-11 CF6-80C 9.1% Mid phase-out
Boeing 777 PW4000G PW, MTU 12.5% Entering phase-out
A380 GP7000 22.5% Mid series production
Appendix 2 – Overview of MTU’s narrow- and wide-body engine programs 
 
Source: MTU 
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Appendix (3/3) – Final valuation considerations (2/2) 
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Industry 4.094 is a widely discussed topic, frequently mentioned by top executives active in the 
broad manufacturing spectrum when discussing industrial innovation. MTU has been showing 
analysts and investors how it is preparing for it, having pooled talent and resources to research 
everything from advanced manufacturing techniques and IoT to AI and Blockchain, with potential 
effects in manufacturing processes, predictive maintenance and analytics and robotic process 
automation. However, above all, MTU has proved to be much more motivated by the potential of 
Additive Manufacturing (AM) as an alternative to its core and well-established manufacturing 
processes. As Figure 1 depicts, MTU is in a very-well regarded position in both AM activity and 
installed machine capacity, while GE is considered to be the leading A&D player in the space. 
Indeed, the latter has significantly engaged in inorganic initiatives (via M&A and partnerships) 
targeting start-ups and mid-sized companies that are solely engaged in developing this technology. 
Instead, MTU has been organically investing in the technology for years, but only taking a more 
serious step in early 2018, by launching a dedicated unit with 30 professionals to pool expertise and 
resources together. The goal is to find and develop methodologies and strategies to implement AM 
in serial production, maintenance and spare parts servicing. As of today, the company only uses the 
technology to develop useful but basic tools and materials for human intervention in manufacturing 
and maintenance processes, such as borescope bosses used in maintenance for the new PW1100G. 
Simply put, the technology involves “manufacturing” parts, components or actual end-products, 
with computer-aided software (CAD) by successively mounting several layers of chosen materials 
(from metal powder, ceramics and composites to glass, edibles and thermoplastics) to create the 
desired “object”. AM applications in A&D are not at all a novelty. In fact, its first applications root 
back to 30 years ago, when the technology started being used for prototyping and tooling. Today, it 
is considered one of the most mature advanced manufacturing technologies - no longer only for test 
                                                 
94Also coined as the “4th Revolution”, Industry 4.0 is related to technological breakthroughs in manufacturing and industrial processes 
leveraged by new systems, software, data analytics and automation, featuring key concepts such as advanced manufacturing 
techniques, internet of things (IoT), machine learning (ML), artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, etc. 
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and research purposes, but for actual implementation95 - it has the largest potential impact on 
manufacturing processes over the next 5-10 years, according to industry executives96. Nonetheless, 
the key current applications still comprise mostly modeling and prototyping, and to a very limited 
extent, low-volume, simple and replacement parts. Indeed, the A&D industry is highly complex and 
intertwined by several players along the value chain, so the number of different parts and 
components needed to assembly an aircraft is immense, and these naturally come from several 
manufacturers. Maintenance is also very delicate and follows equally-complex standards, regulation 
and certification requirements, for obvious reasons. Hence, most players are still on the “wait-and-
see” game: some CEOs and CFOs are skeptical on the tangible benefits; nonetheless, others are fully 
engaged and might risk making abrupt strategic moves in terms of capital deployment, which might 
not deliver on expected gains and significantly hurt returns to shareholders (GE?). 
 
Assessing the benefits and barriers presented by AM 
 
This technology has the potential to yield several benefits that can strengthen manufacturing 
efficiency, scale economies and end-product performance, especially due to the reduced productions 
costs via lower cost of materials and personnel intervention. Moreover, AM also allows for higher 
product customization and flexibility, allowing A&D players to build increasingly complex engine 
parts/components seamlessly, as is the case for MTU. Indeed, MTU’s manufacturing and 
maintenance activity is focused on three particular components: high-pressure compressors, low-
pressure turbines and turbine center frames, that are highly complex with delicate internal cavities. 
Management has stated that AM in full deployment can indeed simplify and leverage efficiency onto 
                                                 
95 For example, GE Aviation has been able to leverage AM expertise from its GE Additive unit, and in November it successfully 
obtained a “change in design” approval by FAA to use an additively manufactured power door opening system bracket for the GEnx 
engines (in which MTU also participates). This component will enter mass production in early 2019 allow for a c. 10% weight 
reduction and 90% scrap waste reduction, naturally reducing the production and future maintenance costs, as well as lowering fuel 
costs and emission levels for the end-customers (airlines)  
96 Ernst & Young’s Global 3DP study, April 2016 
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its manufacturing processes, especially given the reduction in the number of sub-parts needed. As a 
consequence, it would be able to drive better economies of scale and returns on investment, facing 
lower production and maintenance costs, thereby increasing margins and cash flow conversion 
potential, as well as a reduced engine program development time and costs, narrowing the length of 
investment phases97. The result is clear: with AM under considerable utilization rates, the room for 
value creation in future investment and consolidation phases is significantly large. 
On the other hand, there certainly are reasons supporting the fact that AM is still not used in series 
production by any manufacturer. Indeed, A&D executives face significant strategic and operational 
challenges: AM-enabled technology, machinery and systems require material investment efforts as 
well as integration with other processes and systems, in a supply chain where different participants 
need to do business “in tandem” as they depend on each other for engine and aircraft programs to be 
successful. Moreover, there is also a lack of qualified experts able to implement and run AM-led 
processes, as well as fears that product quality and standards could be driven down, in an industry 
where regulation and product certification is paramount. However, perhaps more importantly, 
companies are simply much more comfortable with the current manufacturing processes, which are 
well established and deeply entrenched in its operations and respective supply chains. Moving to a 
revolutionary standard would imply significant risks that could derail their companies’ ability of 
generating returns, especially given the substantial investment that would involve incorporating AM 
in their core manufacturing activities. 
 
Building scenarios to contextualize different margin gain potential 
 
In order to incorporate the potential effect of AM in MTU’s future performance, an additional 
scenario analysis was developed, as to incorporate hypothetical benefits generated by the use of this 
                                                 
97 The whole engine development lifecycle is shortened given the simplified modeling, handling and logistics 
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technology with varying levels of “success”, or degree to which it is actually entrenched in the 
company’s activity. This analysis is then naturally based in long-term assumptions, with the explicit 
DCF analysis extended to 2038F, after which the CV methodology is still applied. 
MTU has officially entered its new consolidation phase in 2018: it is now reaping the benefits of last 
years’ research and investment efforts towards the new engine programs that have entered into 
service or are soon to do so. The GTF and GEnx are the company’s key revenue drivers in what 
concerns OEM series production, and this year’s topline and bottom-line development will largely 
start reflecting the results of these initiatives, especially the first (GTF). The base-case scenario 
(“original”) previously developed entails lower and stable CAPEX and R&D outlays as is normal for 
every consolidation phase (albeit with some short-term needs). This naturally drives up ROIC as 
MTU sees its topline expand, especially when the ramp-up “cools down”, series production 
normalizes and aftermarket servicing needs start kicking in, margins start going up.  
For this analysis, in building these scenarios, the underlying dynamics are projected to be quite 
different; for MTU to be able to reap the benefits from AM-based manufacturing processes in its 
next consolidation phase (post-2030F), it needs to invest materially in R&D (research initiatives, 
qualified personnel, prototyping and modeling, etc.) and CAPEX (machinery, systems, perhaps 
additional space, etc.). Hence, an extended and more intense investment phase is accounted for, 
starting in 2022F (as opposed to 2025F, as is expected by management) and ending in 2030F, when 
MTU expects to deploy an improved/upgraded version of its recently launched GTF engine family. 
Importantly, this analysis assumes these investments are deployed across all scenarios, 
independently of the assumed success rate, which purposefully incorporates the risk that MTU may 
not be able to reap the benefits of the significant investments later on. As mentioned above, this 
reflects one of the fears that inhibits executives from engaging more seriously in AM.98 
                                                 
98 GE appears to be the only A&D player that actually is in that situation right now. Its investments (organic and inorganic) in AM 
have been quite significant, but material returns are yet to be seen. 
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The scenarios are based on how significantly AM is expected to be implemented in core/series 
production, as figure 2 suggests. The first scenario, more “bullish” by nature, calls for a 75% 
integration of additive manufacturing processes in MTU’s production capabilities, entailing a 
significant yet gradual gain in margins of c. 10% by 2034F.99 The other scenarios account for a 50% 
and 25% integration in core manufacturing capabilities, resulting in 5% and 2.5% total margin gains, 
respectively. A fourth scenario (“base-case”) involves MTU failing to successfully implement AM 
in its manufacturing and maintenance practices, despite the material investments committed between 
2022F-2030F, therefore driving down its returns on capital and severely affecting the company’s 
value.  As a result, the cash flow and value creation dynamics are severely altered, with the worst-
case scenario, where MTU is not able to incorporate AM technologies despite the investments, being 
the one with the most hindered value creation capacity. Indeed, the 7.8% ROIC in perpetuity is well-
below the projected ROIC in the original scenario. Conversely, the most likely case with AM effects 
(30% probability), leads to a long-term ROIC of c. 10%; naturally, the most bullish case calls for 
outstanding value creation capacity (c. 16% ROIC) likely justified by outstanding market 
positioning, leveraged by much stronger technological and commercial competitive edges. In the 
end, each scenario implies differing enterprise values and upside/downside potential compared to the 
original case. Based on an existing survey of industry executives100, a blended and probabilistic 
valuation approach is employed, from which an upgraded Dec. 2019 PT of €235.8 is derived, based 
on a c. €16bn Total Enterprise Value, result of the modified DCF analysis of MTU’s core 
operations101, and the unchanged assessment of the company’s non-operating assets, liabilities, 
debts, etc. The goal of this brief analysis was to incorporate the possibility of MTU engaging more 
intensely with AM in the mid-to-long term, integrating the upside and downside risks that are likely 
                                                 
99 The margin gains are reflected in the ‘COGS’ line item in the supporting DCF model. This reflects both the decrease in the cost of 
materials as well as personnel expenses, both included in this item 
100 Ernst & Young’s Global 3DP study, April 2016 
101 Except the extended explicit forecast window and changes across scenarios in cost margins and investment-related assumptions, 
the valuation model is completely unchanged. As such, eliminating the two latter factors, the DCF value would be exactly the same as 
in the original equity research report, as would be expected, given that an extended FCF window simply alters the breakdown of the 
total value of the company, and not the whole 
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associated with it. There are naturally many other effects and consequences of incorporating this 
technology, especially in what concerns MTU’s surrounding supply chain, commercial relationships 
and top-line development opportunities. Perhaps most importantly, it would be interesting to 
understand the type of competitive position achieved by MTU compared to Rolls-Royce, GE and 
Safran, the long-standing reference players, both competing and partnering with it. However, an 
improved competitive positioning would likely involve developing other components, which appears 
to be miles away from the company’s historical drive, strategic goals and management’s vision. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Aerospace and Defense (A&D) Additive Manufacturing Industry Activity Map. Adapted 
from Roland Berger “Additive Manufacturing in Aerospace and Defense”, May 2017< 
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Figure 2 - Key assumptions to each scenario. The DCF Model presented as part of the full equity research report 
is the underlying base for these hypothetical scenarios, and should be checked in conjunction with this report for 
any other information and details 
Scenario Cost of Sales R&D CAPEX PP&E
1. Base-case - no implementation Null
2. 25% implementation -2.5% in 5 years
3. 50% implementation -5% in 5 years
4. 75% implementation -10% in 5 years
+25bps (OEM) and 
+15bps (MRO) 
increments every 
year until 2030F. 
Then trends down 
back to cycle-
average levels (in 
perpetuity)
Remains high for 
longer, until 
2025F, then trends 
down to cycle-
average levels (in 
perpetuity)
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Figure 3 -  ROIC results for each of the hypothesized scenarios. The average invested capital is taken into account for the 
ROIC calculations for all scenarios 
Figure 4 – Results of each scenario analysis and blended valuation approach;  
Note: The Original Scenario does not refer to the latest valuation assessment compiled by the team, as there were significant 
adjustments made to estimates as we were provided with more information from the company and the market, therefore the 
base share price differs from the EUR 195.7 presented in the main valuation report 
Scenario Probability
Resulting total 
EV
Resulting share 
price
Upside (downside) to 
original case
0. Original scenario n/a 12047 203 n.a
1. Base-case - no implementation 30% 12206 168 -17%
2. 25% implementation 30% 14873 217 7%
3. 50% implementation 25% 17540 265 30%
4. 75% implementation 15% 22874 361 78%
Blended approach 15940 236 16%
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